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INTRODUCTION 
Over two hundred and fifty million transactions occurred on the 
Ethereum blockchain in 2018.1 This staggering level of digital commerce 
was powered almost entirely by “smart contracts,” or self-executing chunks 
of computer code that immutably transfer assets between users.2 
 
1 Ethereum Transaction History, ETHERSCAN, https://etherscan.io/chart/tx 
[https://perma.cc/SW7Z-KQZP] (last visited February 21, 2019). 
2 Ethereum by the Numbers, CONSENSYS (Dec. 6, 2018), https://media.consensys.net/ethereum-
by-the-numbers-3520f44565a9 [https://perma.cc/ KB8K-ANC4] (“Since late 2017, the number of 
successful calls to smart contracts has remained consistent at 1.2 million per day.”); Pramod 
Chandersekhar, Ethereum Smart-Contracts: Most of Them Are Rarely Used!, HACKER NOON (May 16, 
2018), https://hackernoon.com/ethereum-smart-contracts-most-of-them-are-rarely-used-
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Proponents of blockchain technology see these automated, irreversible 
agreements as one of Ethereum’s greatest innovations, offering a virtually 
costless contractual enforcement mechanism.3 Some early adopters have 
even claimed that electronic asset-transference has rendered traditional 
contract law entirely obsolete.4 
Despite such assertions, pre-coded agreements are riddled with a host of 
practical and governance-based complications. As Ethereum users have 
repeatedly discovered, simply because an agreement is self-executing does not 
mean that it will deliver an intended result.5 This routine divergence of 
outcomes and intentions have naturally left some unsatised parties reaching 
for legal recourse.6 
Unfortunately, smart contracts possess certain inherent characteristics 
that make ex-post legal enforceability a dubious proposition. In addition to 
 
f45749730d3e [https://perma.cc/7UPL-F36J] (stating that roughly forty percent of Ethereum 
transactions utilize smart contracts). 
3 See Reggie O’Shields, Smart Contracts: Legal Agreements for the Blockchain, 21 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 177, 183 (2017) (“The perceived benets of smart contracts include increased speed and 
accuracy of business transactions, more ecient business operations, and better, quicker, and 
cheaper enforcement of contracts.”). 
4 James Rogers, Harriet Jones-Fenleigh & Adam Sanitt, Arbitrating Smart Contract Disputes, 
INT’L ARB. REP., Oct. 2017, at 21, 22 (“Many technologists believe that Smart Contracts replace 
contract law and courts and tribunals with code.”). 
5  See, e.g., Ivica Nikolić, Aashish Kolluri, Ilya Sergey, Prateek Saxena & Aquinas Hobor, 
Finding The Greedy, Prodigal, and Suicidal Contracts at Scale, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 34TH ANNUAL 
COMPUTER SECURITY APPLICATIONS CONFERENCE 653, 659-660 (2018) (agging “1,504 
candidates contracts (438 distinct) which may leak Ether to an arbitrary Ethereum 
address[;]	. . .	1,495 contracts (403 distinct), including the ParityWalletLibrary contract, as found 
susceptible to being killed by an arbitrary address[;] . . . 31,201 greedy candidates (1,524 distinct), 
which amounts to around 3.2% of the contracts present on the blockchain[;] . . . [and] 294 contracts 
[that] have received Ether after they became dead”); Charlotte R. Young, Note, A Lawyer’s Divorce: 
Will Decentralized Ledgers and Smart Contracts Succeed in Cutting Out The Middleman?, 96 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 649, 661 (2018) (“In June 2016, a hacker attacked a DAO, utilizing a blockchain based smart 
contract, and stole in excess of $70 million USD.”); Elaine Ou, Smart Contracts Are Still Way Too 
Dumb, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2017, 2:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-
11-16/smart-contracts-are-still-way-too-dumb [https://perma.cc/6EE2-62MX] (“Last week, more 
than $150 million worth of ether, the platform’s currency, ended up stuck in the wallets—
forever	. . . . [A] few months earlier, a bug . . . allowed hackers to run off with $32 million. Shortly 
before that, a Canadian exchange accidentally trapped $13 million in its own broken smart 
contract.”). 
6 See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also Nikhilesh De, QuadrigaCX Owes Customers 
$190 Million, Court Filing Shows, COINDESK (Feb. 1, 2019, 9:28 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/quadriga-creditor-protection-ling (stating that “[i]n a sworn adavit 
led Jan. 31 with the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Jennifer Robertson . . . said the exchange owes 
its customers roughly $250 million CAD ($190 million)”); Statewide Civil Caseload Composition in 26 
States, 2016, CT. STATISTICS PROJECT, 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/Civil/PDFs/EWSC-2016-CIVIL-Page-
3-Comp-Bars.ashx [https://perma.cc/F5TJ-Y9E8] (last visited Nov. 1, 2019) (indicating that in many 
states, contract disputes account for the majority of civil claims). 
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doctrinal woes concerning contract formation and term denitiveness, 
practical hurdles—namely smart contract self-execution and pseudonymous 
counterparties—present seemingly insurmountable barriers to obtaining 
one’s day in court. Even if one assumes such a day in court is possible, 
blockchain proponents may not wish to subject their pseudonymous 
transactions to traditional forms of adjudication. In many ways, reliance on a 
centralized third party greatly undermines the theoretical and philosophical 
bedrock of blockchain technology. Placing oneself at the mercy of a 
government to amend on-chain mistakes negates the core purposes of a public 
blockchain: decentralization,7 consumer autonomy,8 and complete 
transactional privacy.9 
Thus, the practical and ideological disconnects between crypto-commerce 
and legal proceedings suggest that smart contract adjudication is not long for 
traditional tribunals. While certain states have enacted legislation aiming to 
legitimate these disputes and introduce them into their courtrooms,10 these 
attempts are sorely misguided in light of Ethereum’s pseudonymous nature.11 
Given that traditional tribunals do not present a viable method for smart 
contract adjudication, the salience and importance of alternative recourse 
options will only continue to increase. The ever-growing volume, size, and 
complexity of transactions on Ethereum12 will shine an increasingly brighter 
 
7 Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of Decentralization, MEDIUM (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralization-a0c92b76a274 
[https://perma.cc/545E-6RNE] (“‘Decentralization’ is one of the words that is used in the 
cryptoeconomics space the most frequently, and is often even viewed as a blockchain’s entire raison 
d’être . . . .”). 
8 PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW 43 (2018) 
(“Perhaps most profoundly, blockchains are characterized by their ability to facilitate the deployment 
of autonomous software that is not under the control of any one party.”). 
9 Jordan Cliord, Privacy on the Blockchain, HACKER NOON (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://hackernoon.com/privacy-on-the-blockchain-7549b50160ec [https://perma.cc/D2ZA-6MZW] 
(“Financial privacy means being able to transact without revealing or leaking identifying information. 
The goal is to make it as difficult as possible for others to profile your crypto use. Privacy puts the 
user in charge of their data.”). 
10 See SMART CONTRACTS ALLIANCE, CHAMBER OF DIG. COMMERCE, SMART 
CONTRACTS: IS THE LAW READY? 23 (2018) (“Various U.S. state legislatures (e.g., Arizona and 
Tennessee) have enacted or are planning to enact specific legislation attempting to authorize the 
use of smart contracts in electronic records and signatures, so that they are fully enforceable by a 
court of law.”). 
11 See Mike Orcutt, States That Are Passing Laws to Govern “Smart Contracts” Have No Idea What 
They’re Doing, MIT TECH. REV. (March 29, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610718/states-that-are-passing-laws-to-govern-smart-
contracts-have-no-idea-what-theyre-doing/ [https://perma.cc/DT8Y-QK8S] (suggesting that a lack 
of coordination between states, the diculty of identifying smart contracts, and increased 
complexity may undermine the ecacy of state laws adequately regulating smart contracts). 
12 Ethereum Average Block Size Chart, ETHERSCAN, https://etherscan.io/chart/blocksize 
[https://perma.cc/5SRD-BLSN] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019); Ethereum Total Daily Gas Used Chart, 
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light on immutably unsatisfactory smart contracts.13 In turn, current and 
potential Ethereum users may become fearful of “on-chain”14 contractual 
obligations, ultimately deterring widespread blockchain adoption and slowing 
the once-potent decentralization movement to a denitive stop. 
In an attempt to cure crypto-commerce of this inherent technological 
shortcoming, Ethereum application developers have begun to introduce on-
chain dispute resolution systems. Despite the infancy of these platforms, 
supporters are quick to claim that they will usher in “a new era of low cost 
and universally accessible justice[.]”15 While each currently available 
application differs from its peers in certain key respects,16 every application 
flows from the same basic premise: arbitration that incorporates a blockchain 
is the most effective method for resolving disputes that arise on a blockchain. 
In practice, this means that emerging Ethereum platforms such as Kleros,17 
JUR,18 Aragon Network Jurisdiction,19 and OpenCourt20 enable contracting 
parties to precode an option for ex-post, fully decentralized arbitration. 
As a succinct elevator pitch, blockchain-based arbitration seems like a 
promising and practical solution to suboptimal self-executing smart 
contracts. If blockchain technology is truly an anchor for the next phase of 
electronic commerce, then a digitized and decentralized dispute resolution 
process will be necessary for its success.21 As the argument goes, on-chain 
 
ETHERSCAN, https://etherscan.io/chart/gasused [https://perma.cc/WTS7-K3T7] (last visited Feb. 
21, 2019); Ethereum Network Utilization, ETHERSCAN, https://etherscan.io/chart/networkutilization 
[https://perma.cc/Y4TE-GWC9] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019). 
13 Evidence of growing concern can be found in Section I.C, which details the small but 
increasing academic interest in smart contract dispute resolution. 
14 “On-chain transactions refer to those cryptocurrency transactions which occur on 
the blockchain—that is, on the records of the blockchain—and remain dependent on the state of the 
blockchain for their validity.” Jake Frankeneld, On Chain Transactions (Cryptocurrency), 
INVESTOPEDIA (April 5, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/chain-transactions-
cryptocurrency.asp [https://perma.cc/M6BX-T92R]. 
15 OpenLaw, OpenCourt: Legally Enforceable Blockchain-Based Arbitration, CONSENSYS (Oct. 18, 
2018), https://media.consensys.net/opencourt-legally-enforceable-blockchain-based-arbitration-
3d7147dbb56f [https://perma.cc/C3MU-SP5L] [hereinafter OpenCourt]. 
16 These differences will be explored in Part II. 
17 KLEROS, https://kleros.io/ [https://perma.cc/MP92-AKN7] (last visited March 13, 2019). 
18 JUR, https://jur.io/ [https://perma.cc/L2CJ-TQWQ] (last visited March 13, 2019). 
19 ARAGON, https://aragon.org/network/ [https://perma.cc/2579-MWRY] (last visited 
March 13, 2019). 
20 See OpenCourt, supra note 15 (“That is why the era of decentralized dispute resolution 
procedures is beginning.”). 
21 Blockchain proponents specically cite it as integral to the completion of Web 3.0, a term 
used to describe the next phase of the Internet in which the initial mass migration to social 
networking sites and online shopping is optimized and perfected. See e.g., Anthony J. Biller & David 
M. Chambers, Distributed Ledger Trademark Registry? A Proposal for One Ledger to Rule Them All!, J. 
INTERNET L., Nov. 2018, at 12, 14 (“As we move to an AI Web 3.0, a trademark ledger could in 
theory implement a smart algorithm to calculate the rate of geographic expansion within market 
segments . . . .”). 
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arbitration oers the best of both worlds, allowing disputants and jurors to 
remain pseudonymous without sacricing the right to expedient, cheap, and 
satisfactory adjudication. 
But blind deference and acceptance of such tools, based on perceived 
convenience, has troubling justiciability implications. It would be foolish and 
dangerous for lawmakers, programmers, and platform users to simply assume 
the ecacy of these mysterious computer programs. As soon as one pushes 
past the veneer of alleged superiority, a multitude of problems quickly begin 
to arise. Thus, before reliance on blockchain-based dispute resolution systems 
expands any further, two vital policy questions must be answered: (1) Does 
blockchain-based dispute resolution suer from inherent technological aws 
that inhibit adequate adjudication? And (2) if so, are any of these on-chain 
options still somehow equivalent or superior to o-chain alternatives? 
This Comment will attempt to answer both questions. Part I will rst 
oer a brief overview of both blockchain technological processes and existing 
academic literature concerning smart contract dispute resolution. Part II will 
elucidate the realm of current and forthcoming blockchain-based arbitration 
applications. Part III, the heart of this Comment, will then identify the 
inescapable shortcomings associated with these applications. Specically, it 
explores three gaping issues inherent in blockchain technology: (1) those 
associated with the discovery process; (2) those associated with juror voting 
incentives; and (3) those associated with platform scalability. Part IV will 
nally consider whether these dispute resolution platforms, despite their 
distinctive aws, are an improvement upon o-chain adjudication options 
available to Ethereum users. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that it is 
impossible for on-chain dispute resolution to successfully emulate any o-
chain alternative without sacricing the guiding principles of blockchain. 
Users will not be able to remain pseudonymous, nor will decentralized 
decision-making ever be able to ecaciously resolve disputes at scale. No 
literature currently exists which comprehensively examines the feasibility of 
such on-chain decision making systems. Thus, this Comment will serve as a 
useful guidepost to policymakers, businesses, and developers as application 
adoption expands. 
I. OVERVIEW OF TECHNOLOGY AND EXISTING LITERATURE 
A. Blockchain Technology 
Many blockchain-focused articles begin with an in-depth explanation of 
the technology itself. While these comprehensive descriptions are useful and 
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informative, they are also plentiful22 and laborious.23 Lengthy discussions of 
key blockchain concepts such as decentralization, hashing, mining, and 
immutability tend to be exhausting, confusing, and occasionally downright 
maddening.24 Luckily, such discussions are unnecessary for present purposes. 
This Comment is far more concerned with what these technological processes 
enable and far less with how the technology works. Thus, before exploring 
on-chain dispute resolution application feasibility, this Comment need only 
provide an extremely brief overview of key blockchain concepts. Specically, 
it touches upon the general structure of a public blockchain, as well as those 
technological features that may restrain the functionality of on-chain dispute 
resolution systems. Importantly, readers familiar with the technological 
concepts surrounding public blockchains can skip the following background 
section. These readers may resume at Section I.C, Existing Literature. 
1. Blockchains Generally 
At the highest level, a public blockchain is a decentralized and immutable 
digital ledger of transactions.25 The latter half of this denition—a digital 
ledger of transactions—is readily understandable, familiar, and hardly 
disruptive. For example, any Venmo user who has ever examined her history 
has interacted with a simple digital ledger.26 It is instead these rst two 
denitional components—decentralization and immutability—that excite 
“cypherpunks”27 and confuse casual observers. As will become clear, these two 
fundamental mechanisms of crypto-commerce are the very same structural 
deciencies that obfuscate successful on-chain and o-chain legal recourse. 
 
22 See, e.g., Nathan Fulmer, Exploring the Legal Issues of Blockchain Applications, 52 AKRON L. 
REV. 161, 166-71 (2018); Wulf A. Kaal & Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, 73 
BUS. LAW. 109, 114-25 (2017); Jesse Marks, Distributed Ledger Technologies and Corruption: the Killer 
App?, 20 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 42, 45-58 (2018). 
23 See supra note 22. 
24 See What is Blockchain?, LISK ACADEMY, https://lisk.io/what-is-blockchain 
[https://perma.cc/XJ6J-JE9T] (last visited December 20, 2019). 
25 See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 327 (2017) 
(“In theory, no one can alter an existing transaction, because every block is linked in an immutable 
sequence.”); id. (“The blockchain is not stored in one central location. Instead, computer nodes 
running the Bitcoin software connect in a peer-to-peer (P2P) network, where each maintains a 
complete copy of the blockchain.”); see also Buterin, supra note 7 (“Blockchains are politically 
decentralized . . . and architecturally decentralized . . . .”). 
26 Transaction History, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016096974-
Transaction-History [https://perma.cc/URB6-DRRV] (last visited March 13, 2019) (“To view 
your complete transaction history or statement, you can log into your Venmo profile from a 
computer’s browser.”). 
27 Declan McCullagh, Technology as Security, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130 (2001) 
(referring to “[a] loosely organized group of essayists, activists, and programmers . . . [who have] 
been . . . erce champion[s] of a technology-over-law approach”). 
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2. Decentralization 
Decentralization refers to the fact that no singular authority figure validates 
or mediates individual transactions on a blockchain.28 Instead, a digital copy of 
the blockchain ledger is continuously and completely available for storage and 
monitoring by any user with an internet compatible device.29 These devices, 
known as “nodes,”30 are the backbone of decentralization’s success. A public 
blockchain relies on a subset of nodes—referred to as “miners”31—to verify and 
validate every transaction that appears on the chain.32 Without miner 
consensus, a given transaction will not post to the blockchain ledger.33 This 
supposedly enables a global commercial ecosystem that requires zero oversight 
from centralized governments or large institutions. These dispersed, 
anonymous miners replace such regulatory entities.34 
Venmo again oers a useful lens for understanding the practical dierence 
between centralized and decentralized transactions. When Venmo User A 
sends money to Venmo User B, the money simply shifts between two Venmo-
 
28 Jeremy M. Sklaro, Comment, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
263, 267 (2017) (“Broadly labeled ‘decentralized ledger technology’ (DLT), the term spans a group 
of cryptographic tools and protocols to exchange, verify, and secure data without the need for 
centralized intermediaries.”). 
29 Jimi S., Blockchain: What Are Nodes and Masternodes?, MEDIUM (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://medium.com/coinmonks/blockchain-what-is-a-node-or-masternode-and-what-does-it-do-
4d9a4200938f [https://perma.cc/SNV5-LPYS] (“Nodes can be any kind of device (mostly computers, 
laptops or even bigger servers). Nodes . . . [C]onstantly exchange the latest blockchain data with each 
other so all nodes stay up to date. They store, spread and preserve the blockchain data, so theoretically 
a blockchain exists on nodes.”). 
30 Id.; see also Sklaro, supra note 28, at 267-68 n.12 (dening nodes as “computers in a 
decentralized ledger system which participate in recording and verifying transactions”). 
31 CoinGeo Exchange, Blockchain Nodes Explained, XCELLAB MAG. (Nov. 15, 2019), 
https://medium.com/xcellab-magazine/blockchain-nodes-explained-ac278e256a 
[https://perma.cc/Y6P4-5Z29] (“As the owners of nodes willingly contribute their computing 
resources to store and validate transactions, they have the chance to collect the transaction fees and 
earn a reward in the underlying cryptocurrency for doing so. This is known as mining or forging.”). 
32 Sabih Rehman, What Is Blockchain?, XCELLAB MAG. (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@sabih811/when-and-where-blockchain-comes-9a2e59edea 
[https://perma.cc/VW86-NUW8] (“Rather than relying on a central authority to securely transact 
with other users, blockchain utilizes innovative consensus protocols across a network of nodes, to 
validate transactions and record data in a manner that is incorruptible.”). 
33 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 36 (“If a majority of nodes supporting the network 
do not agree on a change, a blockchain will remain the same.”). 
34 Importantly, miners are rewarded for their transaction-validation eorts through small 
payments of localized, blockchain-specic digital currency (i.e. crypto-currency). Ethereum miners, 
for example, receive ether, whereas Bitcoin miners receive bitcoin. See id. at 40 (“By using block 
rewards and transaction fees, blockchains incorporate payo structures designed to reward parties 
that maintain a blockchain-based network.”); Ameer Rosic, Ethereum Mining 101: Your Complete 
Guide, HUFFPOST (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.hungtonpost.com/entry/ethereum-
mining-101-your-complete-guide_us_58b6e1eee4b02f3f81e44e9f [https://perma.cc/J4UQ-65PH] 
(describing the mining process and its necessity). 
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controlled accounts.35 The entirety of the digitized currency remains on the 
Venmo platform and is subject to Venmo’s control. Until the digitized cash 
leaves the platform, the only update is to each user’s “Venmo History” ledger 
and corresponding on-application account balance.36 Venmo, as the 
centralized authority gure, still has the unilateral capability to reverse and 
restrict transactions.37 Conversely, on a public blockchain like Ethereum, 
there is no centralized overseer.38 If Ethereum User A sends ether39 to 
Ethereum User B and a disaggregated majority of miners veries that 
transaction, alteration or reversion becomes virtually impossible.40 The 
specics of the transaction are beyond the reach of miners, unsavory hackers, 
and even the users themselves. Such decentralization supposedly deters 
oppressive governmental and corporate overreach.41 
3. Immutability 
The second core component of blockchain technology—immutability—
ows from its decentralization. Specically, the miner verication process 
renders ledger alteration virtually impossible. The ledger is protected by a 
“Merkle tree” structure of encryption, in which each new encrypted block of 
transactions incorporates a string of characters that represents and 
encapsulates the previous block of transactions.42 If a single nefarious user 
 
35 See Venmo Balance, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/217042588 
[https://perma.cc/8E5L-D7QZ] (last visited March 13, 2019). (“[I]f you have access to a balance and 
it covers the entire payment, it will be pulled from your balance.”). 
36 Transaction History, VENMO, https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016096974-
Transaction-History [https://perma.cc/URB6-DRRV] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
37 Erik Kuebler, Op Ed: Venmo Oers the Ultimate Cryptocurrency Experience, BITCOIN MAG. 
(June 7, 2018), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/op-ed-venmo-ultimate-cryptocurrency-
experience/ [https://perma.cc/J4BA-5SWN] (“The Venmo network is owned by PayPal. 
Transactions can be reversed and/or monitored for scams via Venmo customer support. There are 
also limitations placed on transactions . . . .”). 
38 Cf. id. (“The Bitcoin network has no intermediaries and cannot be censored/modied unless 
there is a signicant attack . . . .”). 
39 Haseeb Qureshi, A Hacker Stole $31M of Ether —How it Happened, and What it Means 
for Ethereum, FREECODECAMP (July 20, 2017), https://medium.freecodecamp.org/a-hacker-stole-
31m-of-ether-how-it-happened-and-what-it-means-for-ethereum-9e5dc29e33ce 
[https://perma.cc/9GCK-3XAM] (“Ethereum’s corresponding digital currency, ether, is essentially a 
side effect of powering this massive computer.”). 
40 See DE FILLIPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 25. 
41 See generally Buterin, supra note 7 (describing the mechanisms and benets of blockchain 
decentralization). 
42 A “Merkle tree” is broadly dened as 
a way of hashing a large number of “chunks” of data together which relies on splitting 
the chunks into buckets, where each bucket contains only a few chunks, then taking 
the hash of each bucket and repeating the same process, continuing to do so until the 
total number of hashes remaining becomes only one: the root hash. 
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attempts to alter a posted transaction, such a change reverberates through the 
entire system; theoretically modifying every transaction on the chain.43 All 
other nodes quickly become aware of that attempt and refuse to approve it.44 
For this reason, a blockchain is said to be immutable.45 
This memorialization process is technical and confusing, but it is not 
overly important that one understand its inner workings. For present 
purposes, it is only important to recognize that a public blockchain is in fact 
immutable, and that smart contracts are subject to this rigidity. 
4. Pseudonymity 
Before turning directly to smart contracts, it is pivotal to note that 
blockchain-based transactions are performed pseudonymously, unless the user 
chooses to self-identify. Public blockchain users have the ability to hide 
behind a string of characters while utilizing “asymmetric cryptography” to 
securely and privately send services and goods to one another.46 Specically, 
Ethereum users possess both a public and a private key.47 The former is a 
unique string of characters personalized to a specic user, but which may be 
viewed by all other Ethereum users.48 When a transaction is posted to a 
blockchain, it displays the public key of each transacting party.49 The private 
key, as the name suggests, is not for public viewership.50 It is maintained by 
a single user and should never intentionally be posted on the ledger. In a 
 
Vitalik Buterin, Merkling in Ethereum, ETHEREUM BLOG (Nov. 15, 2015), 
https://blog.ethereum.org/2015/11/15/merkling-in-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/JL2H-GRLE]. 
43 DE FILLIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 25 (stating that “[b]ecause the header of each block 
incorporates a hash of the preceding block’s header, anyone trying to modify the content stored in a 
block will inevitably break the chain.” Thus, “[e]ven a small alteration . . . will necessarily trigger a 
change to the hashes of all subsequent blocks,” which means that “[a]nyone willing to modify . . . 
would have to go through the computationally expensive task of generating new hashes for every 
subsequent block . . . . The more transactions that occur on the network . . . the harder it becomes 
to retroactively modify previously recorded transactions.”). 
44 Id. 
45 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 327 (“In theory, no one can alter an existing 
transaction, because every block is linked in an immutable sequence.”). 
46 See Toshendra Kumar Sharma, How Does Blockchain Use Public Key Cryptography?, BLOCKCHAIN 
COUNCIL (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.blockchain-council.org/blockchain/how-does-blockchain-use-
public-key-cryptography/ [https://perma.cc/Z849-Z2TT] (“Asymmetric cryptography or public 
cryptography is an essential component of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum.”). 
47 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 14-15 (“Public-private key cryptography solved this 
problem by enabling the sending of encrypted messages without the need for a shared key. Under 
Die and Hellman’s model, both parties would agree on a shared pub[l]ic key and each party would 
generate a unique private key.”). 
48 Id. at 15 (“The private key acted as a secret password, which parties did not need to share, 
whereas the public key served as a reference point that could be freely communicated.”). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
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sense, it is a password to access les and information encrypted with a user’s 
matching public key.51 
Concretely, if Party A wishes to send a condential document to Party B, 
Party A encrypts that document with Party B’s public key. When Party A 
sends the document to Party B, the transmission is recorded on the 
blockchain, but its contents are hidden from all other users. Only the private 
key of Party B can decrypt the message and view the content. 
Importantly, while it is technically possible to identify the user behind a 
public key, it is extremely costly and impracticable.52 By and large, most 
transactions on Ethereum occur between parties that are eectively 
locationless, nameless, and unidentiable.53 This pseudonymity creates major 
jurisdictional complications with regard to transaction dispute resolution54 
and greatly limits the opportunity for o-chain alternatives. 
B. Smart Contracts and Oracles 
Thus far, this Comment has used the amorphous term “transaction” to 
explain the basic workings and goals of a blockchain. While it is true that all 
blockchains aim to facilitate secure, trusted, and pseudonymized transactions, 
the scope and complexity of possible transactions dier tremendously 
depending on a user’s blockchain of choice. The rst-ever Bitcoin blockchain, 
for example, was specically designed for the trading of cryptocurrency.55 
 
51 Id. 
52 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8 at 29 (“The open and decentralized nature of 
Ethereum allows smart contracts to be deployed pseudonymously and to operate in a largely 
autonomous manner.”). But see Cliord, supra note 9 (describing rst the methods that exist for 
linking one’s identity with a set of transactions, and then describing the many blockchain-based 
eorts to negate this ability for the average, unsophisticated user); Will Price, Clustering Ethereum 
Addresses, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Dec. 6, 2018), https://towardsdatascience.com/clustering-
ethereum-addresses-18aeca61919d?gi=625b0a0828e5 [https://perma.cc/2FKD-9J46] (stating that 
“[e]thereum users may be anonymous, but their addresses are unique identifiers that leave a trail 
publicly visible on the blockchain”). 
53 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 29. 
54 See, e.g., Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 22, at 134 (“Traditional jurisdictional means have 
limited applicability in the context of blockchain technology. Jurisdiction over the public 
blockchain does not exist within the present doctrinal infrastructure for jurisdiction. In practice, 
the blockchain itself cannot be regulated or governed because it is decentralized and 
autonomous.”). Such issues are only further complicated by additional technological updates that 
aim to push pseudonymity into the realm of anonymity by enabling individual users to dissociate 
public keys from a specific history of transactions. Thus, any attempt to use the historical list of 
transactions for a single public key may soon be futile, making off-chain dispute resolution even 
less likely. See, e.g., Clifford, supra note 9 (“Many schemes have been devised to erase a bitcoin’s 
history — restoring privacy and preserving fungibility.”). 
55 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 27 (“However, the more people who considered 
Bitcoin, the more its limitations became apparent. Bitcoin excelled as a platform to facilitate the 
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Bitcoin does have the technical capabilities to execute slightly more complex 
transactions, but this decade-old platform almost exclusively handles the 
straightforward transference of digital moneys.56 
Given the inherent limitations of Bitcoin, newer blockchains like 
Ethereum and EOS have emerged to oer users a “richer functionality”57 
through the advent of smart contracts.58 This term, “smart contract,” is often 
derided as a misnomer and deserves further consideration.59 
As noted above, a smart contract is a “self-executing digital transaction[] 
using decentralized cryptographic mechanisms for enforcement.”60 In other 
words, it is a method of transferring assets that relies on a series of “if-then” 
logic statements which cannot be halted once executed.61 Many academics 
do not consider every manifestation of this self-executing code to be a fully 
 
exchange of digital currency, but without updating the underlying protocol, it could not be used for 
much more.”). 
56 Cf. Yes, Bitcoin Can Do Smart Contracts and Particl Demonstrates How, BITCOIN MAG. (Oct. 
13, 2017), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/yes-bitcoin-can-do-smart-contracts-and-particl-
demonstrates-how/ [https://perma.cc/89JA-BSZB] (“Ethereum might be a strong foundation for 
writing very complex smart contracts, or ones in which security and privacy are not priorities, 
but Bitcoin provides a simpler and more reliable scripting framework for the private escrows that 
Particl requires.”). 
57 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 27. 
58 Id. at 27-28 (stating that “[t]he rst blockchain to enable the creation and deployment of 
sophisticated smart contracts was the Ethereum blockchain” and “unlike Bitcoin, Ethereum is faster 
and has a greater range of capabilities when it comes to smart contracts”). It should be noted that 
each of these platforms has its own native currency. Ethereum miners strive to amass “Ether” in the 
same way that Bitcoin miners strives for Bitcoins. Further, Ethereum enables users and applications 
to issue their own coins, in what is known as an Initial Coin Oering (ICO). Users may oer their 
individualized token to investors in exchange for ether or at currency. This ICO funds the 
development of blockchain application that often requires ether or the individualized token to use. 
If the application is successful, those who participated in the ICO will see a rise in the value of the 
individualized token. However, the creation of coins on a given blockchain creates certain cross-
platform trading diculties, the scope of which is beyond this Comment. See generally, Shaahan 
Cohney, David Homan, Jeremy Sklaro & David Wishnick, Coin-Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. 
L. REV. 591 (2019) (discussing the potential value of regulating ICOs). 
59 See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts Are Ambiguous, 2 J.L. INNOVATION 1, 2 
(2019) (“‘Smart contracts’ are neither smart nor contracts, but the name has stuck.”). 
60 Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 313. 
61 See Sklaro, supra note 28, at 291 (“Computer code must be precisely and completely dened, 
because at root it is a series of if-then instructions that must all be resolvable by a computer.”). As a 
technical matter, smart contracts exist as individual Ethereum accounts wholly separate from that of 
the contracting parties. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 28. Users send “messages” to the 
contract account, enclosing all necessary information within the message for a smart contract to self-
execute. Id. At a minimum, these messages contain the address of the sender, the desired destination, 
and the amount of ether (Ethereum’s base cryptocurrency) associated with a transaction. Id. This 
message executes the smart contract, resulting in the transfer of some digital asset, performance of 
some digital service, or potentially the calling upon another smart contract to perform some 
additional function. Id. at 29. 
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formed, legally enforceable contract.62 However, this code is often 
connected to a semantic, natural-language e-document that resembles a 
traditional contract. Parties read this semantic component and sign it with 
a pseudonymous blockchain address.63 In actuality, signing the natural 
language contract may be an entirely separate action from initiating the 
code-based smart contract. Further, the corresponding code may or may not 
perform in accordance with what the semantic document conveys, leading 
to suboptimal results. 
Despite the occurrence of such suboptimal results, smart contracts enable 
a range of interesting use cases. Ethereum users can, for example, engage 
freelance website developers, exchange ether for live-video streams, purchase 
physical commodities, and place sports bets; all via the Ethereum 
blockchain.64 Many of these use cases rely on “oracles,” or technological 
blockchain add-ins that enable a smart contract to access information external 
to the ledger.65 Oracles are a major catalyst for blockchain-based disputes, as 
they allow for real-world human error to penetrate the immutable code-based 
ledger. Further, each individual use-case may vary greatly in complexity, as 
transacting parties have the option to pre-code an innite number of terms 
and conditions into the code-based agreement. 
As alluded to above, once a smart contract is initiated, its execution is 
inevitable. No user can stop the triggering of conditions and the resulting 
ow of assets as prescribed by the code. This nality is cemented by the 
structural rigidity and immutability of blockchain technology. Simply put, 
Ethereum purposely removes any ex-post mechanism to amend the results. 
Once the transaction is complete, the transfer of digital assets is forever 
transcribed on the Ethereum blockchain. Thus, without taking certain 
precautions, smart contracts are stricken by the same permanence as all other 
forms of crypto-asset transference. 
 
62 See Grimmelmann, supra note 59, at 3; Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 367-68 
(“Contract law developed over centuries to account for situations that arise in the execution of 
agreements. Through the inductive process of the common law, courts evolved solutions to novel 
problems. Upon closer examination, many of these rules are in tension with smart contracts’ 
mechanism of automatic, irrevocable enforcement.”). 
63 See Aaron Wright, OpenCourt: Legally Enforceable Blockchain-Based Arbitration, YOUTUBE 
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oVy43YgnY&feature=youtu.be 
[https://perma.cc/FKG7-TJ5Q] [hereinafter OpenCourt Tutorial] (describing the process by which 
parties sign the semantic contract component). 
64 Bernard Marr, 30+ Real Examples of Blockchain Technology in Practice, FORBES (May 14, 2018, 
1:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/14/30-real-examples-of-blockchain-
technology-in-practice/#6b9e47740d [https://perma.cc/65ET-YB5W]. 
65 In the classic example, a smart contract for a farmer’s insurance could include an oracle that 
performs a daily check of the temperature in a farmer’s geographic location by accessing a weathering 
website. If the oracle reports an excessively hot temperature for a successive number of days, the 
insurance contract would issue a payout to the farmer. See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 331. 
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Unfortunately, the range of possible ex-ante precautions is sparse. The 
parties may attempt to code for every permutation, but such upfront 
programming is costly and undesirable.66 Alternatively, as this Comment 
addresses, parties may pre-code an ex-post quality control check. This pre-
code is the foundational element of on-chain smart contract dispute 
resolution.67 In such a situation, the code of a smart contract enables a 
dissatised purchaser to initiate on-chain dispute proceedings prior to 
contract completion. 
C. Existing Literature 
This Comment now turns to literature specically surrounding on-chain 
dispute resolution. While legal academia has produced a wide array of 
interesting and important blockchain literature in recent years, there are 
surprisingly few articles that substantively and exclusively examine the 
developing phenomenon of on-chain arbitration. Those articles that do exist 
lay an excellent foundation for discussion but do not fully articulate the 
limitations of these new platforms. 
In Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution, perhaps the most direct and 
comprehensive legal examination of on-chain dispute resolution, Professors 
Wulf A. Kaal and Craig Calcaterra advocate for “an open-source platform 
ecosystem of smart contracting dispute resolution that allows users to opt in 
to conict resolution mechanisms .	.	.	.”68 The article thoroughly examines the 
physical jurisdictional issues associated with in-court blockchain resolution,69 
but does not consider shortcomings with the authors’ proposed theoretical 
crypto-arbitration solution. Indeed, in Part III, this Comment will briey 
evaluate Kaal and Calcaterra’s proposed upgrade to the Aragon and 
OpenBazaar on-chain dispute resolutions systems.70 
Similarly, in Contracts Ex Machina, Kevin Werbach and Nicolas Cornell 
explore when and how ex-post smart contract enforcement poses novel and 
 
66 Sklaro, supra note 28, at 297-98 (“Tapscott and Tapscott observe that lower costs of 
‘monitoring [and] enforcing’ a smart contract are oset by higher ‘up front’ costs of ‘determining 
agreement terms.’”). 
67 ”Ex-post” may not be the wholly correct term to use, as the option to arm satisfaction with 
a transaction springs to life immediately prior to smart contract nalization. 
68 Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 22, at 148. 
69 See id. at 133-139 (highlighting the anonymity of blockchain transactions, enforceability of 
smart contracts, and limited regulatory oversight as the primary reason that smart contracts fall 
beyond traditional tribunal reach). 
70 See id. at 144-148 (describing the aws in both the Open Bazaar and Aragon dispute 
resolution system, and then suggesting “an open-source platform ecosystem of smart contracting 
dispute resolution that allows users to opt in to conict resolution mechanisms that simultaneously 
could enable more nuanced crypto solutions and produce greater (legal) certainty”). 
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challenging questions to traditional contract dispute doctrines.71 The 
authors ultimately conclude that smart contract adoption will cause the 
posture of claims to shift, but that “[l]itigation—like nature—will find a 
way.”72 However, they do not address the feasibility of traditional litigation 
when both parties are pseudonymous. Further, the authors only briefly 
acknowledge on-chain resolution options, noting that “giving authority to 
human oracles who decide whether the factual basis for performance has 
been met, or employing arbitrators who resolve disputes through a multisig 
arrangements, may avoid some of the draconian implications of fully self-
enforcing agreements.”73 
Jeremy Sklaro oers additional important insights into the “inexibility 
in smart contracts,”74 providing an in-depth comparison of self-executing 
agreements and traditional malleable o-chain contracts.75 Sklaro focuses 
on the benets of contractual exibility and the need for traditional intra-
party mechanisms to interpret subjective contractual terms, such as “good 
faith” and “best eort” clauses.76 However, he also briey explores the 
feasibility of on-chain dispute resolution systems, surmising that 
“blockchain-based dispute resolution is radically uncertain without oering 
any advantage over traditional contract litigation.”77 
While Sklaroff does indeed identify several of the same issues explored 
here, his quick analysis of on-chain juror incentivization schemes,78 practical 
scalability, and choice-of-law selection79 does not directly or completely address 
the inherent, inescapable flaws of on-chain dispute resolution.80 In some sense, 
Sklaroff asks whether current iterations of on-chain dispute resolution offer any 
 
71 See Werbach & Cornell, supra note 25, at 318 (“Contract law is a remedial institution. Its aim 
is not to ensure performance ex ante, but to adjudicate the grievances that may 
arise ex post. Smart contracts bring this core function of contract law into sharper relief, [by 
eliminating] the act of remediation by admitting no possibility of breach.”). 
72 Id. at 376. 
73 Id. at 375. 
74 See Sklaro, supra note 28, at 291-96 (arguing that smart contracts are awed because they 
“must be written in precise, fully dened computer code; they are unmodiable once executed; and 
they favor anonymous and one-o transactions.”). 
75 See id. at 292 (noting that if parties wanted to modify their original agreement, “[t]his 
exibility would not have been an option if the agreement were a smart contract.”). 
76 See id. at 281 n.74 (“Other examples of contractual standards include best eort clauses, 
duciary duties of agents to principals, and the performance of obligations in good faith.”). 
77 Id. at 300 (capitalization altered). 
78 See id. at 301 (“In these decentralized resolution systems, parties cannot know how to craft 
their arguments to maximize success or minimize risk.”). 
79 See id. (“But each moderator is free to decide her cases based on whatever substantive 
principles she prefers, which may or may not be evident from her listing.”). 
80 See id. at 302 (“As a result, decentralized adjudication will grow more resource-intensive 
over time as parties attempt, and inevitably fail, to dene every contingency ex ante with the 
exacting rigor of computer code.”). 
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advantages over traditional adjudication, whereas this Comment will explore 
whether on-chain resolution is perpetually bound to inferiority. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there exists a slew of literature concerning 
o-chain online arbitration (“OArb”81). While not specically addressing 
blockchain technology, much of this past writing helps to comparatively 
inform this Comment’s discussion of aws associated with on-chain 
arbitration. Existing OArb-related articles identify arbitral seat 
determination,82 choice-of-law selection,83 and the impracticalities of 
discovery and testimony84 as particularly problematic in the OArb context. 
Importantly, some of the proposed and implemented xes for traditional and 
online arbitration aws become increasingly complicated when applied to on-
chain dispute resolution.85 
II. ON-CHAIN DISPUTE RESOLUTION PLATFORMS EXPLAINED 
With a review of smart contract technology and related academic 
literature in hand, this Comment may now turn to the specics of blockchain-
based dispute resolution. While the market for on-chain applications is not 
overly saturated, a handful of successful dispute protocols do currently exist.86 
 
81 See Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering Consumers 
Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 183 (2010) (“This has left binding online arbitration 
(I will refer to it as ‘OArb’ for ease of reference and to distinguish it from non-binding [Online 
Dispute Resolution] methods) largely overlooked.”). 
82 See id. at 211 (“[I]t is dicult to dene the ‘seat of the arbitration’ for OArb, as is often 
required to determine the law applicable for enforcement of any arbitration agreements and awards 
as well as the law the arbitrators will use in deciding the parties’ claims.”). 
83 See id. (“Choice of law questions nonetheless create additional concerns 
for OArb agreements and proceedings because many countries refuse or are reluctant to enforce pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer and electronic contracts.”); see also Nicolas de Witt, 
Online International Arbitration: Nine Issues Crucial to its Success, 12 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 441, 452 
(2001) (“Online international arbitration cannot bear the costs of protracted argument on the issue 
of applicable law, allowing practices such as ‘dépeçage’ or any other complex doctrine of private 
international law.”). 
84 See de Witt, supra note 83, at 457 (“Evidentiary rules in international online arbitration will 
drastically dier from those of traditional arbitration . . . .”). 
85 For example, Claudia T. Salomon and Sandra Freidrich discuss the use of “telephone or 
video conferencing technology” in the online arbitration context, which allows “hearing participants 
to ‘virtually appear’ before the tribunal” and thus ease the costs of discovery and advocacy. This may 
seem like a promising solution for all forms of web-based arbitration, but the calculus changes when 
parties are entitled to and desire transactional anonymity. This line of literature highlights an 
eventual key takeaway. The well-documented problems associated with traditional OArb are not 
only present with on-chain resolution application, but also are often exacerbated due to blockchain’s 
inherent structure. Claudia T. Salomon & Sandra Friedrich, Obtaining and Submitting Evidence in 
International Arbitration in the United States, 24 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 549, 583 (2013). 
86 No clear market leader has yet emerged from this list of competitors, but Kleros seems to 
have amassed an early lead. As of January 2020, Kleros boasts a market cap of $3.1 million and a 
“Kleros Court Dapp” that has already “resolved over 150 cases” worth hundreds of thousands of 
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Platforms such as Kleros, JUR, Aragon Network Jurisdiction, 
OpenCourt, and OpenBazaar87 offer products that supposedly perfect the 
smart-contracting process. These applications are similar in many key 
respects, but each one attempts to differentiate itself from its peers by 
trumpeting unique juror-incentivization strategies, different levels of legal 
enforceability, and specialized tribunals. This Part will outline the 
adjudication processes and procedures of these on-chain applications, 
highlighting key differences among them. The application overview 
proceeds sequentially, attempting to guide the reader through an on-chain 
dispute resolution as it occurs in real time.88 
A. Agreement Formation 
On-chain applications require the implementation of an escrow-like 
system to facilitate agreement formation.89 At the start of a transaction, a 
purchaser deposits a sucient level of funds into a smart contract.90 This 
crypto-payment will remain in escrow on the blockchain until (1) the 
 
dollars in the aggregate. KLEROS BLOCKFYRE REPORT, BLOCKFYRE 2 (2020), 
https://drive.google.com/le/d/1AjdFJTikOfIf5nws01Gi9WkyvuHehzIp/view 
[https://perma.cc/XR2G-4ZU7]; see also KLEROS ONE PAGER, KLEROS 1 (2019), 
https://kleros.io/onepager_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q93Q-QT79] (“$400k passed through the TCR 
. . . . More than 50 Jurors have ruled on cases . . . . Over 100 cases [have been] ruled on . . . . Over 
$15K [has been] paid in fees to jurors”); Kleros (PNK), COINGECKO, 
https://www.coingecko.com/en/coins/kleros [https://perma.cc/C3XF-4M4N] (last visited Jan. 15, 
2020). 
87 See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. OpenBazaar will not be explained in more 
detail, as it largely duplicative of other dispute resolution systems. For an overview, see Austin 
Williams, Escrow Smart Contract Specication in OpenBazaar, OPENBAZAAR (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://openbazaar.org/blog/Escrow-Smart-Contract-Specication-in-OpenBazaar/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WMA-Y8BU]. 
88 For a comprehensive explanation of each individualized platform, see ALEXANDER 
SHEVTSOV, JURY.ONLINE, RESPONSIBLE ICO 4 (2019), 
https://icosbull.com/whitepapers/110/Jury.Online_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/F26T-FY6J]; 
JUR, WHITE PAPER V.0.3, at 33-34 (2018) [hereinafter JUR WHITE PAPER], 
https://icosbull.com/whitepapers/4088/JUR_whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/95UC-L28U]; 
Clément Lesaege & Federico Ast, Kleros Short Paper v1.0.6, at 3 (Nov. 2018) [hereinafter Kleros 
White Paper] (unpublished manuscript), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318877800_Kleroterion_a_decentralized_court_for_the_I
nternet [https://perma.cc/J9CC-JKKP]; Aragon Network, GITHUB (Aug. 28, 2018) [hereinafter 
Aragon White Paper], https://github.com/jiangbubai/aragon-whitepaper [https://perma.cc/HVN9-
CHPN]; Tatu Kárki, Aragon Network Jurisdiction Part 1: Decentralized Court, ARAGON (July 18, 2017), 
https://blog.aragon.org/aragon-network-jurisdiction-part-1-decentralized-court-c8ab2a675e82/ 
[https://perma.cc/68TF-ASSU]; OpenCourt Tutorial, supra note 63. 
89 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 76 (“Interested buyers can send money to a 
virtual escrow account implemented via a smart contract . . . . [I]f a dispute arises over the quality 
of the good . . . a human-based oracle steps in to analyze the facts of the case and determine who 
should receive the escrowed funds.”). 
90 This smart contract will pre-code the basic components of the transaction. 
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purchaser conrms satisfaction with seller performance, or (2) any initiated 
dispute has been resolved.91 Importantly, purchaser manifestation of approval 
may only occur if the smart contract has designated a dispute resolution 
application—such as JUR or Kleros—ex ante.92 This code-based designation 
allows the purchaser to freeze the smart contract one step short of nalization 
and call upon the application to resolve a dispute.93 Depending on the 
platform, certain procedural elements of the dispute must also be specied ex 
ante. Kleros, for instance, requires users to select the number of jurors, a 
specialized “subcourt,”94 and a list of possible future remedies prior to 
contract formation.95 
Most of these dispute resolution applications also oer users an 
opportunity to create a natural language agreement to accompany the code-
based smart contract. The level of contractual clarity and comprehensiveness 
varies by platform, with certain applications going to great lengths to achieve 
traditional legal enforceability.96 OpenCourt, for example, oers templates 
for drafting a natural language contract to supplement the Solidity97 code-
based agreement.98 The application interface allows Ethereum users to 
 
91 DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 76. 
92 See, e.g., Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 3) (“Smart contracts have to 
designate Kleros as their arbitrator.”). 
93 See id. at 12 (“In case of dispute, Kleros can be used to have the smart contract either 
reimburse the buyer or pay the earlier.”). To reiterate, unless the parties pre-code for this option, no 
such quality control exists. The purchaser’s cryptocurrency is automatically delivered to the seller 
presuming the conditions of the contract are met. For instance, consider a smart contract in which 
a user pays a merchant to provide her with a link to a live concert stream. The user executes the 
contract and receives a link to a live concert stream, but the link is broken. If payment is simply 
contingent on the user receiving the link, that user has no recourse. The same is not true if the smart 
contract contains an option for on-chain resolution. 
94 Kleros currently offers a variety of sub-courts such as “International Deliveries” Court—
a sub-court of “E-Commerce” Court (itself a sub-court of “General Court”)—intending to 
produce arbitrators with expertise particularized to given smart contract. See Kleros White Paper, 
supra note 88 (manuscript at 11). 
95 FEDERICO AST ET AL., KLEROS, DISPUTE REVOLUTION: THE KLEROS HANDBOOK OF 
DECENTRALIZED JUSTICE 31 (2019) [hereinafter KLEROS HANDBOOK], 
https://ipfs.kleros.io/ipfs/QmZeV32S2VoyUnqJsRRCh75F1fP2AeomVq2Ury2fTt9V4z/Dispute-
Resolution-Kleros.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA9N-ZL7R] (“Contracts between parties will specify the 
subcourt where a dispute will be adjudicated, including the number of jurors that will be drawn for 
the rst instance decision.”); see also E-mail from Stuart Jackson, Commc’ns Lead, Kleros, to 
Michael Buchwald (Feb. 18, 2019, 06:46 EST) [hereinafter Jackson E-mail] (on le with author) 
(“Yes, answers are precoded (there is a xed set of answers).”). 
96 The practical value of achieving traditional legal enforceability when both parties are 
pseudonymous is questionable. This proposition is explored below. 
97 See Solidity, SOLIDITY, https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.3/ [https://perma.cc/XP6B-
R7LZ] (last visited March 14, 2019) (“Solidity is an object-oriented, high-level language for 
implementing smart contracts.”). 
98 OpenCourt, supra note 15 (“Unlike other bills of sale, our bill of sale is structured using 
our markup language and incorporates the OpenCourt arbitration system, comprised of a series of 
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populate templates with pseudonymous Ethereum addresses, ether values, 
and boilerplate arbitration clauses.99 This enables the parties to “generate a 
legally compliant bill of sale that is managed and digitally signed via a 
blockchain.”100 Importantly, any “bill of sale” is wholly distinct from the smart 
contract itself. Simply because a natural language term exists does not mean 
that the code will truly carry out that function. Indeed, many smart contract 
disputes arise because party intentions and code manifestations diverge. 
These two components, a pre-coded smart contract and its natural 
language counterpart, are the tools by which parties enter and initiate an 
agreement when opting into on-chain resolution. 
B. Dispute Resolution Initiation 
Given the escrow-like system of each available platform, there is little 
variation among applications for initiating a dispute. In all cases, the 
dissatised purchaser may use the application to trigger dispute resolution 
prior to code-completion. Sellers generally do not have this capability, as they 
have not posted a payment to the smart contract.101 If a seller feels that she is 
justied in non-performance, the validity of such a position will theoretically 
come to fruition via the adjudication process. 
There are, however, slight dierences among platforms with respect to 
the responsibilities entrusted to the dispute initiating purchaser. On JUR, for 
instance, the party initiating the dispute must propose a particularized 
remedy upon initiation.102 The defending party then has twenty-four hours 
to counter with an alternative solution.103 This supposedly builds in the 
exibility for narrowly tailored outcomes, unlike the pre-coded relief options 
utilized by Kleros.104 
 
smart contracts.”); see also JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 33 (“Agrello is another player 
oering an interactive graphical interface that allows ordinary users to create legally binding smart 
contracts using natural legal language, which is later converted to a smart contract.”). 
99 OpenCourt, supra note 15 (“[P]roviding contracting parties with an agreement containing a 
dispute resolution provision (approved by the well-known arbitration association JAMS) to ensure 
the enforceability of the arbitrator’s decision in the real world.”). 
100 Id. Compare this system to Kleros, which actively avoids automatic incorporation of a 
natural language contract into the dispute. See KLEROS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 104 (“When 
there is no written agreement, the plainti can present communication with the defendant prior to 
the agreement to prove that the defendant did not meet the requirements agreed upon.”). 
101 JUR seems to be an exception to this statement. See JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 
19 (“In the absence of agreement, one of the two parties opens a dispute . . . .”)(emphasis added). 
102 See id. (“In the absence of agreement, one of the two parties opens a dispute by proposing 
a resolution and staking a minimum percentage of the value of the contract. The other party has 24 
hours to propose an alternative solution.”). 
103 Id. 
104 See KLEROS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 164 (“Smart contracts are immutable, meaning 
that the code by default cannot be changed.”). 
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C. Evidence and Arguments 
Regardless of platform, discovery processes and ensuing opportunities for 
advocacy are sparse. As a general rule, discovery is entirely optional and self-
imposed. Kleros, JUR, and Aragon all indicate that the discovery process 
consists solely of parties unilaterally uploading any evidence that they see t 
to best support an argument.105 Common examples of such evidence include 
links to uncompleted websites, images with relevant text, and on-chain party 
correspondence.106 Jurors have no mechanism to compel further discovery, 
and counterparties have minimal opportunity to request further relevant 
documents from the opposition. The discovery process is that of a singular, 
un-vetted data-dump. 
Similarly, disputants have minimal opportunity to elucidate the nature of 
a grievance. While the formatting diers by platform, each application calls 
for both parties to upload some version of a “statement of facts.”107 In what 
essentially amounts to a textbox, each party explains why they believe that 
they are entitled to relief.108 On many platforms, no ongoing dialogue exists 
between jurors and disputants. Parties often cannot rebut counterclaims or 
oer clarications about their own past statements in the event that a juror 
becomes confused.109 There is simply this single textbox. 
To further diminish the little argumentative opportunity that advocates 
possess, on-chain platforms oer virtually no basis for grounding an 
argument. At best, platforms provide general guidelines for jurors to utilize 
when rendering a verdict.110 These guidelines, however, do not cover the 
 
105 See Jackson E-mail, supra note 95 (“[J]urors are provided with evidence from both parties 
as to where and what has gone wrong in the contract . . . . Parties can upload any evidence they see 
t as to better explain their side. It could be a link to an uncompleted website, or an image with 
relevant text info.”). 
106 Id. 
107 See Kaal & Calcattera, supra note 22, at 144 (“Whenever users wish to dispute the execution 
of a contract in the Aragon Network, they post . . . a brief of their argument.”); Kleros White Paper, 
supra note 88 (manuscript at 3) (“Alice taps a button that says “Send to Kleros” and lls a simple 
form explaining her claim.”); OpenCourt, supra note 15 (“Using this interface, each party can notify 
OpenCourt that they wish to dispute the smart contract, [and] provide a statement of facts . . . .”). 
108 OpenCourt Tutorial, supra note 63; see also Token Curated Registry of Tokens (T2CR), KLEROS, 
https://tokens.kleros.io/tokens [https://perma.cc/QVR2-ZZTG] (last visited Apr. 26, 2020) 
(providing link to PDFs stating grievances). 
109 A partial explanation for this absence may be that application designers fear parties will bribe 
jurors as a result of this dialogue. See e.g., Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 10); But 
see E-mail from Federico Ast, CEO, Kleros, to David A. Homan, Professor of Law, Univ. of Pa. 
Carey Law Sch. (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:23 AM EST) (on le with author) (providing instructions on how 
to see the “thorough	. . . back and forth between submitter and challengers”). 
110 See KLEROS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 105 (“This policy guides jurors through the 
disputes arbitrated in the subcourt, from their very creation to the rendering of a verdict. Let’s go 
through it step by step.”); Justin Goro, Ulex Applications: Ethereum (Part 3), MEDIUM (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@startsocieties/bootstrapping-ulex-to-run-on-the-ethereum-blockchain-
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entire lexicon of possible disputes, often simply instructing jurors to make a 
decision based on what they believe to be “fair.”111 
D. Juror Selection 
Among those platforms that strive for pure decentralization and 
anonymity, juror selection relies on the core functionality of blockchain 
disaggregation, employing incentive-based crowd sourcing akin to miner 
consensus validation. Unlike involuntary juror selection in the United 
States,112 on-chain anonymous juror-candidates actively volunteer. A 
candidate submits a cryptocurrency deposit in the amount of her choosing 
with the hopes of being selected as a juror.113 
Depending on the platform, the juror-candidate will have the option to 
post this deposit to a specialized subcourt. For instance, JUR oers “Hub” 
virtual tribunals, in which application administrators screen jurors for certain 
qualications.114 Similarly, Aragon imposes additional costs on disputants if 
they wish to obtain a pool of jurors that have positive “reputations.” As Aragon’s 
White Paper notes, “[w]hen a user triggers a dispute they must pay an 
arbitration fee proportional to the amount of reputation that will be included 
on the jury.”115 This supposedly incentivizes quality decision-making and 
weeds out non-meritorious claims. 
Once a suciently large pool of candidates have submitted token 
deposits, a randomized lottery occurs to produce a set of jurors.116 On certain 
platforms, probability of selection in this lottery is directly proportional to 
 
a48c2d5cb731 [https://perma.cc/E84M-9CYY] (“For instance, the following lines would get their 
own text file: 2.1.4. Personal Harm . . . ALI, Restatement of Torts, Third, Liability for Physical and 
Emotional Harm (2009–12).”). 
111 See JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 53 (describing why implementation of a Schelling 
Point game will lead jurors to select “fair” outcomes). 
112 E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2018) (mandating a plan for random juror selection in federal courts); 
see also Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (“It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services 
always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement of those duties 
which individuals owe to the state, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.”). 
113 See Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 4) (“Candidates will self-select to 
serve as jurors using a token called pinakion (PNK).”). 
114 See JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 48 (“Application Policy: to become a member of 
the Hub anyone can apply following the rule established by the Hub (example, to hold a certication 
of engineering).”). 
115 Aragon White Paper, supra note 88. 
116 See Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 5) (“After candidates have self-
selected specific courts and deposited their tokens, the final selection of jurors is done randomly.”); 
Kárki, supra note 88 (“When an arbitration begins, five judges will be randomly selected from a 
pool of volunteers. Volunteers are individuals that have posted a bond indicating their interest in 
serving as a Judge.”). 
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the size of one’s deposit.117 Application developers cite this pairing of 
proportionality and randomization as a method of deterring malicious parties 
who seek to create a large number of Ethereum addresses and thus control 
the entire voting system.118 
One major exception to this volunteer lottery is the process utilized by 
OpenCourt. OpenCourt instead requires each disputant to input a 
pseudonymous Ethereum address of a mutually agreed upon third-party 
arbitrator.119 This mutual appointment resembles the selection processes 
utilized by o-chain arbitration tribunals but presents its own set of criticism 
when employed on-chain. 
E. Juror Decision-making and Financial Incentivization 
Two key attributes of fully decentralized, on-chain juror systems separate 
them from every other adjudicatory process on the planet. First, as just 
mentioned, jurors remain wholly pseudonymous throughout the arbitration 
proceedings. Second, on-chain applications employ a nancially incentivized 
majority-voting scheme.120 Those jurors who fail to vote with the majority 
will lose some or all of this initial deposit.121 In many instances, jurors are 
similarly penalized for revealing their vote before a mutually agreed upon 
time.122 The likes of Kleros and JUR point to Thomas Schellling’s “focal point 
theory” to justify these majority-based schemes.123 As JUR’s white paper 
states, “the best strategy to win the reward is to sincerely predict what other 
people think is fair.”124 The hope is that forcing jurors to take a nancial stake 
in the outcomes will eliminate incoherent and arbitrary voting.125 
 
117 Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 4) (“The probability of being drawn as a 
juror for a specic dispute is proportional to the amount of tokens a juror deposits.”). 
118 See id. (“If jurors were simply drawn randomly, a malicious party could create a high number 
of addresses to be drawn a high number of times in each dispute. By being drawn more times than 
all honest jurors, the malicious party would control the system.”). 
119 OpenCourt Tutorial, supra note 65, at 4:15. 
120 See JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 44 (“Tokens voted for the minority proposition 
are forfeit. Tokens voted for the majority side are matched with forfeit tokens until the forfeit tokens 
run out.”); Kleros White Paper, supra note 88, at 2 (“Parties who voted as the majority are rewarded 
with 10% of their coins. Parties who voted dierently from the majority lose 10% of their coins.”). 
121 See supra note 120. 
122 Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 7) (“We let any party able to show the 
commitment of a juror to Kleros before the vote is closed steal the pinakions of this juror and 
invalidate the vote of this juror.”). 
123 See id. at 2 (“Thomas Schelling described focal point(s) for each person’s expectation of 
what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. The Schelling Coin uses this principle 
to provide incentives to a number of agents who do not know or trust each other to tell the truth.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 53 (“In a Schelling 
Point game . . . . [t]he possible token reward provides an incentive to predict correctly.”). 
124 JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 53. 
125 Id. 
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Importantly, when actually making a decision, jurors have almost no 
analytical framework from which to draw. The aforementioned on-chain 
guidelines are far from comprehensive,126 and jurors have access to only the 
disputed contract (if it exists), the statement of facts, and any evidence 
submitted by each party.127 No on-chain platform currently asks jurors to rely 
on jurisdictional precedent, rigorous legal analysis, or even simple legal tests. 
The jurors, in isolation from one another, simply cast a vote and oer a 
“justication” for voting as they did.128 As will be explored below, pairing this 
lack of structure with nancial incentives renders the system deeply awed. 
F. On-Chain Appeals Process 
After the initial ruling, most fully decentralized platforms oer a 
dissatised party the opportunity to appeal, with the exact format and cost 
diering by platform.129 On Kleros, for instance, each successive appeal 
doubles the number of jurors and thus the up-front arbitration fee.130 This 
system of cost doubling aims to disincentivize excessive appellate 
proceedings. Similarly but distinctly, Aragon disputants may choose to appeal 
the decision of an initial ve-juror panel.131 Appellate proceedings require a 
doubling of the reputational weight of the jury, and thus a doubling of the 
arbitration fee for the appellant.132 In this secondary round of review, dubbed 
a “Prediction Market,” all jurors on the Aragon Network are invited to post a 
bond and rule on the merits of the dispute.133 This costly mass review is 
intended to improve decisional accuracy through an increased sample size, as 
well as deter parties from engaging in frivolous appeals. If a party is still 
unhappy with the results of a prediction market resolution, that party may 
nally appeal to Aragon’s “Supreme Court.”134 This court consists of nine 
pseudonymous jurors who wield the highest reputational ranking on the 
 
126 Id. at 55. 
127 See KLEROS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 34 (“Users that are drawn as jurors will have 
access to the evidence for analysis and will vote a decision.”). 
128 See id. at 35 (“They are also required to provide a justication for their decision.”). 
129 See id. (“Decisions can be appealed several times.”). 
130 See id. (“In each round, a new jury will be formed with twice as many jurors than the 
previous instance plus one. The appealing party will be required to make a new deposit in order to 
pay for arbitration fees.”). 
131 See Kárki, supra note 88 (“If the applicant is unsatised with the ruling of the Decentralized 
Court, they have the option to elevate the issue to the next realm. This is done by posting an even 
larger bond than before.”). 
132 Id. 
133 See id. (“For this round of court, we will use a prediction market where all the Judges of the 
Network can take part — providing the applicant with a much larger audience.”). 
134 See id. (“In Supreme Court, the judges will be composed of the top 9 judges by ANJ payout. 
In other words, these are the individuals with the highest ranking in resolving Aragon Network 
Jurisdiction cases.”). 
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platform.135 These nine arbitrators oer a ruling that will nalize and 
conclude the dispute.136 Interestingly, the nancial compensation for jurors 
in previous rounds may retroactively be reversed in accordance with the 
rulings of the Supreme Court.137 
These two mechanisms for appeal are representative of on-chain 
possibilities. They also represent the conclusion of a dispute and the end of a 
user’s opportunity for recourse. Upon nal determination, the smart contract 
unfreezes and distributes assets accordingly. 
G. Types of Disputes 
Apart from the actual procedures associated with adjudication, it is 
important to note the types of disputes that on-chain applications attempt to 
resolve. To do so, it is useful to imagine the universe of possible disputes as a 
two-by-two matrix, segmented by dispute origin and forum for resolution. 
Intuitively, the forum for dispute will either be on-chain or o-chain. The 
dispute type, which also consists of an on-chain or o-chain possibility, is 
slightly more nuanced. On-chain disputes are those specic to blockchain 
transactions. Bugs in the code138 and phantom transactions139 generate 
disputes derived entirely from smart contract malfunction. Conversely, a 
freelance designer who fails to timely deliver a customer’s website epitomizes 
a dispute with an o-chain origin. The dispute arises solely due to human 
error in attempting to carry out the contract. There is nothing specic to 
blockchain about the origin of the grievance. 
While on-chain resolution is theoretically capable of handling both types 
of issues,140 current platforms are marketed as tools for resolving the latter: 
human error associated with a smart contract. For instance, early Kleros 
promotional materials highlighted the following four applications: 
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., Kai Sedgwick, 25% of All Smart Contracts Contain Critical Bugs, BITCOIN.COM (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/25-of-all-smart-contracts-contain-critical-bugs/ 
[https://perma.cc/4L3K-NNS9] (“Ethereum, the ICO economy’s go-to launchpad, has been the 
worst aected, with stories abounding of exploitable code that’s led to hundreds of millions of dollars 
e[i]ther being stolen or locked up.”). 
139 See, e.g., Morgan E. Peck, What You Need to Know About Mt. Gox and the Bitcoin Software 
Flaw, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:58 PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/computing/networks/what-you-need-to-know-about-mt-gox-and-the-bitcoin-software-
flaw?fbclid=IwAR0uHakOjNJiAbm9TdpTbXrwUSo6IW59h4EaCc0Dp_jVKFRld7OlEQKQ524 
[https://perma.cc/Q6KS-YL97]. 
140 Blockchain dispute resolution platforms are not geared toward handling o-chain disputes 
with o-chain origins, the nal quadrant in the matrix. 
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ESCROW: Kleros can be used to have the smart contract either reimburse the 
buyer or pay the seller. 
INSURANCE AND FINANCE: When an insured event happens, the insurer can 
validate it and compensate the insuree through Kleros. 
FREELANCING: Kleros can be used to solve disputes between freelancers and 
clients. 
CONTENT MODERATION: Kleros can be used to mediate disputes on 
whether a comment violates some community guidelines or whether some 
piece of content violates someone’s rights.141 
Indeed, if relegated only to code-based disputes, on-chain resolution 
platforms would have very few practical use cases. The supposedly disruptive 
contribution of these new applications is that they can reduce the harm from 
o-chain bad actors (i.e., malfeasance or nonfeasance). With the advent of 
on-chain resolution, there is allegedly no longer the worry that users will be 
left without recourse in the event that an oracle-driven blockchain transaction 
goes awry. If businesses are ever to transact on-chain and at scale, there must 
be some mechanism to govern the humans behind the transaction and thus 
limit a rm’s liability. Kleros, JUR, and the like claim to be that mechanism. 
Further, they claim to ll this void without sacricing the core benets of 
blockchain technology. However appealing this sales pitch may be, it is far 
from the truth. 
III. DISTINCTIVE FLAWS OF ON-CHAIN, DECENTRALIZED 
ARBITRATION SYSTEMS 
With the inner workings of on-chain resolution applications now 
elucidated, it is possible to begin compiling and analyzing the set of 
adjudicatory aws that are distinctive to blockchain technology. To do so, it 
will be useful to employ a four-step framework. 
 
1. Determine the shortcomings that exist with current on-chain 
applications. If no aws exist, the analysis will simply end. 
2.  If a aw exists, consider whether it ows from (1) platform infancy or 
(2) the nature of blockchain technology itself. This Comment is less 
concerned with the former, as aws owing from platform infancy 
may be corrected via application updates. 
3.  If a aw is indeed inherent, examine whether it renders on-chain 
resolution inferior to that of its o-chain counterparts. Such an 
 
141 KLEROS BLOCKFYRE REPORT, supra note 86, at 6. 
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examination will require an exploration of current practices among 
various o-chain dispute resolution systems, including traditional 
courts, arbitration tribunals, and o-chain online arbitration (OArb) 
systems.142 
4.  If the rst three questions are answered in the armative, the 
framework will nally ask: what is the optimal path forward?143 
Answering this question requires a holistic balancing of all inherent 
aws as compared to the aws of other adjudicatory systems. 
Embedded within this balancing is a consideration of whether possible 
application updates would sacrice the alleged benets of a 
blockchain. This fourth and nal question will therefore only be taken 
up in Section IV once all inherent aws have been discussed. 
 
The hope is that this analytical framework will first reveal distinctive 
shortcomings of on-chain resolution and then describe how best to proceed in 
light of these flaws. The author has attempted to isolate the core adjudication 
areas in which inherent flaws are most likely to exist. Again, those areas 
specifically include (1) discovery compulsion processes, (2) juror incentivization 
and decision-making schemes, and (3) platform scalability. Thus, an exhaustive 
review of every component of the adjudication process is unnecessary. 
A. Flaw 1: Inability to Compel Discovery 
1. Current Flaws with On-Chain Discovery 
Despite noticeable variation among current on-chain application 
functionality, not one of these platforms enables a juror to compel 
discovery.144 As described above, on-chain resolution mechanisms rely 
 
142 If on-chain and o-chain resolution systems suer from an identical aw, it would be 
illogical to assume on-chain resolution inferiority. If, however, technological limitations present a 
aw beyond those present in o-chain alternatives, one must then consider the practical value of 
using such a system in the future. 
143 Regardless of the aw, the answer to this nal question splinters into three possibilities. 
First, the aw and resulting harm might be so egregious that they negate any possibility of viable 
on-chain arbitration. In other words, the aw requires us to abandon all hope. Second, the aw 
might inherently dierentiate, but not beyond the point of salvation. An imperfect system may still 
be the penultimate system. The optimal path forward might be to encourage application designers 
to push on-chain arbitration towards its technological optimum without compromising basic 
blockchain tenets. This would, however, rst require a determination that the benets of a 
“perfected” model outweigh the inherent shortcomings. Third, there may be some scenario in which 
it makes sense to sacrice blockchain pseudonymity and decentralization to achieve the ecacy of 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. For instance, one proposition this Section will explore is 
a move away from anonymous jurors. However, this nal suggestion raises further questions as to 
why one would use blockchain at all if its main advantages have disappeared. 
144 Nor is there an option for a counterparty to request discovery documents. 
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exclusively on self-imposed production.145 Further, these platforms oer little 
guidance as to what should be included.146 Applications generally prompt 
each party to upload an optional “statement” in which the party articulates a 
grievance, as well as any evidence that may further its claim.147 These two 
streams of production establish the entire universe of documents available for 
juror review. 
Given this self-imposed discovery, two distinct types of information will 
come to dominate on-chain disputes: (1) materials which reflect positively 
on the party who submitted the evidence and (2) materials which damage 
or discredit the claims of the opposition. While this set of documents is 
important and useful, it is ultimately insufficient for proper adjudication. 
Self-imposed discovery specifically omits all documents that inflict self-
harm. On-chain, this third source of information falls into oblivion. Even 
in the simplest of disputes, the proverbial “smoking gun” disappears behind 
a wall of blockchain pseudonymity, presenting major opportunities for 
deceitful—but not impermissible—omissions.148 
Consider a smart contract in which a purchaser engages the service of a 
freelance website designer. Assume the freelancer produces a half-hearted 
product, and for some inexplicable reason, decides to e-mail (or message via 
a decentralized chat app like EtherChat149) a friend about her lack of eort 
on the project. As just indicated, jurors possess no mechanism to compel the 
discovery of that all-important email. The total absence of discovery 
compulsion mechanisms is therefore the rst great aw of on-chain 
arbitration, and it is thus necessary to determine whether such a aw exists 
for other resolution tribunals. 
 
145 See Jackson E-mail, supra note 95 (“[J]urors are provided with evidence from both parties 
as to where and what has gone wrong in the contract . . . . Parties can upload any evidence they see 
t as to better explain their side. It could be a link to an uncompleted website, or an image with 
relevant text info.”). 
146 See KLEROS HANDBOOK, supra note 95, at 32 (providing few rules or guidelines governing 
the form and content of written submisssions on Kleros). 
147 See JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 52 (describing the role of the jurors as analyzing 
“the proofs made by the parties and their explanation of facts.” (emphasis added)); OpenCourt Tutorial, 
supra note 65, at 3:43; Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 3) (“Alice taps a button that 
says ‘Send to Kleros’ and lls a simple form explaining her claim.”); Aragon Whitepaper, supra note 
88, § 3.2 (stating that there is a period of “Evidence Submission . . . [in which] parties of an 
agreement can submit statements and evidence to the jury”) (emphasis removed). 
148 The term deceitful is used loosely, given that if a system does not compel discovery, it 
would not technically be fraudulent to withhold incriminating information. 
149 See Minh Nguyen, EtherChat: Decentralized Messaging Application on Ethereum Platform, 
MEDIUM (Apr. 1, 2018), https://medium.com/@leonardnguyen/etherchat-decentralized-messaging-
application-on-ethereum-network-part-1-253e5078770b [https://perma.cc/GRP6-9PYP] (“EtherChat 
is a[] decentralized app running on Ethereum platform that allows you to send encrypted messages via 
a smart contract. Only you and the recipient of a message can decrypt it.”). 
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2. Methods for Compelling Discovery O-Chain 
Unfortunately for on-chain platforms, discovery compulsion is 
widespread and expansive among o-chain alternatives. While an obvious 
gradation exists o chain, it is clear that on-chain dispute resolution stands 
alone in its current holistic inability to compel. 
a. Traditional Tribunals 
Traditional civil procedure most clearly juxtaposes current on-chain 
resolution capabilities, with the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
presenting perhaps the greatest divergence.150 As Salomon and Friedrich 
explain: 
U.S. litigation is particularly known for its full-blown discovery, in which 
courts routinely grant the parties expansive disclosure 
requests[,]	.	.	.	.	provid[ing] for a myriad of discovery mechanisms, including 
document disclosures, oral and written depositions, interrogatories and 
requests for admission. Under Rule 26, the permissible scope of discovery is 
extremely broad, allowing parties to “obtain	discovery regarding any 
nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense.”	.	.	.	.	Similar rules can be found at the state level.151 
Importantly, a failure to comply with valid discovery requests results in 
punishment. Under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[i]f a 
party fails to make a disclosure required by	Rule 26(a), any other party may 
move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions.”152 While Rule 45 
does lay out geographical limitations for subpoenaing a witness or compelling 
an appearance, it also oers litigants the opportunity to obtain vital 
information by reducing the burden and costs for the producing party.153 
Such an ability to compel evidence does not stop at the United States’ 
geographic borders. 28 U.S.C. §	1783 stipulates that “[a] court of the United 
 
150 Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 551. 
151 Id. at 551-52. While a 2015 amendment the Federal Rules introduced a proportionality 
limitation, it remains to be seen how much this limitation will scale back discovery requirements 
in practice. See, e.g., Matthew T. Ciulla, Note, A Disproportionate Response? The 2015 Proportionality 
Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b), 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1395, 1396 (2017) 
(“Among the most significant and contentious of these changes is the Rules’ renewed focus on 
the concept of proportionality in the scope of discovery, added in an effort to curb perceived 
over-discovery.”). 
152 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A). 
153 FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(1)–(2)(stating that “[a] subpoena may command a person to attend a 
trial, hearing, or deposition . . . within 100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or 
regularly transacts business in person” but that “[a] subpoena may command . . . production of 
documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things at a place within 100 miles of where 
the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person”). 
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States may order the issuance of a subpoena .	.	. of a national or resident of 
the United States who is in a foreign country, or requiring the production of 
a specied document or other thing by him .	.	.	.”154 Similarly, for a purely 
foreign and tangential witness, the Hague Convention oers U.S. courts and 
international counterparts an opportunity (albeit more limited) to compel 
discovery from nonparties.155 
b. Arbitration Tribunals 
The same overwhelming level of production compulsion is rarely present 
within an arbitration tribunal.156 As opposed to traditional expansive 
discovery rules, arbitration proceedings are guided by the arbitration-specic 
laws of the relevant arbitral seat.157 Such laws generally promote arbitrator 
and party autonomy,158 establishing two sources of authority that govern the 
discovery process. Firstly, the parties themselves may agree to particular 
initial requirements for production volume and scope.159 Secondly, the 
arbitrator may compel document production as she sees t, often in spite of 
party pre-agreements.160 The interaction between these two sources of 
authority dier by region and arbitrating body,161 but the existence of the 
latter provides evidence of an arbitrator’s perpetual ability to compel 
discovery. Indeed, the arbitrator “generally ha[s] broad implied authority to 
conduct the disclosure process, even where the relevant arbitral rules (and 
 
154 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) (2018). 
155 Cf. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 541 (1987) 
(“[T]he text of the Convention draws no distinction between evidence obtained from third parties 
and that obtained from the litigants themselves . . . . Thus . . . the optional Convention 
procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of evidence by the means 
authorized in the Convention.”). 
156 See Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 553 (“As a general rule, the disclosure phase in 
an international arbitration tends to be much shorter and succinct.”); id. at 553-54 (“Indeed, the 
limited availability of disclosure in international arbitration is a key dierence between judicial and 
arbitral proceedings.”). 
157 See id. at 553 (“[T]he arbitral tribunal’s authority to order disclosure may stem from 
provisions in the procedural laws at the arbitral seat.”). 
158 See id. at 552 (“Generally, parties may agree on the procedure of an international arbitration, 
including the disclosure process. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the principle of party 
autonomy in international arbitration.”). 
159 Id. 
160 See id. at 553 (“[T]his exibility to shape the arbitral process according to the specics of 
each business relationship is one of the reasons parties choose arbitration over litigation.”). 
161 For instance, the International Arbitration Rules of the International Centre for Dispute 
Resolution unqualiedly provide that that an arbitration tribunal may “order parties to produce 
other documents, exhibits or other evidence it deems necessary or appropriate.” Id. at 565 (quoting 
INT’L CTR. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES art. 16(1) 
(2009)). Conversely, § 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act and subsequent U.S. Supreme Court cases 
indicate that traditional court-system discovery is not appropriate in an arbitrational tribunal unless 
the parties specically agree to it. 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2018); Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 563. 
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domestic arbitration legislation) do not specically address the issue.”162 This 
power often also extends to instances in which parties stipulate discovery 
limitations that the arbitrator nds to be inequitable.163 
However, the proper authority to order document production greatly 
diers from an ability to actually compel it. To eectively compel discovery, 
an arbitrator must possess some form of credible sanction in the event that a 
party fails to comply.164 Problematically, arbitrators do not wield the same 
subsidiary tools to ensure enforcement as executive and legislatorial-backed 
court systems. In one sense, the greatest threat an arbitrator may unilaterally 
impose is the drawing of an “adverse inference”165 for a failure to disclose. 
Without the threat of enforcement by a governmental actor, penalized parties 
will aord little weight to arbitrator-imposed nancial sanctions.166 This is 
especially true when an arbitrator seeks disclosure from a geographically 
distant third party. 
To remedy this insuciency, most arbitration systems allow “the tribunal 
and the parties [to] seek judicial assistance in accordance with national laws 
in obtaining disclosure.”167 While enlisting court-assistance creates its own set 
of risks and limitations168 (particularly in the Second169 and Third170 Circuits), 
these restrictions aim only to ensure that compulsion requests stay limited to 
relevant and inaccessible information.171 O-chain arbitration discovery is 
 
162 Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 569. 
163 See id. at 557 (“The parties may also agree to preclude or signicantly limit disclosure as 
long as fundamental principles of procedural fairness and equality are respected.”) (emphasis added). 
164 See Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235, 
245 (2019) (“[E]nforcement provides a credible threat of punishment when rules are ignored.”). 
165 See Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 584 (“Where a party fails to comply with the 
tribunal’s order to produce documentary or witness evidence without reasonable excuse, the tribunal 
may draw adverse inferences against that party.”). 
166 This situation may be likened to a judge asking a baili to detain an unruly witness, only 
to nd that the baili has indenitely stepped out to lunch. 
167 See Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 586. 
168 See Claudia Salomon & Abhinaya Swaminathan, Compelling Third-Party Discovery in New 
York Arbitration, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 26, 2018, at 1, 1 (describing the limitations placed on compelled 
discovery in certain federal circuit courts). 
169 See Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“[A]rbitrators possess a variety of tools to compel discovery from non-parties. However, 
those relying on section 7 of the FAA must do so according to its plain text, which requires that 
documents be produced by a testifying witness.”).  
170 See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(“Thus, Section 7’s language unambiguously restricts an arbitrator’s subpoena power to situations in 
which the non-party has been called to appear in the physical presence of the arbitrator and to hand 
over the documents at that time.”). 
171 It should be noted, however, that in practice, instilling compulsion power primarily with 
the arbitrators results in a truncated discovery process. See, e.g., Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85. 
This truncation of document production is accompanied by a parallel scarcity of witness testimony, 
third-party documents, and non-party witnesses. Thus, much like on Kleros, parties tend to 
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therefore more narrow than that compelled by traditional tribunals, but it 
appears that a perpetual and global option for compulsion remains. 
c. Online Arbitration 
In theory, Online Arbitration discovery does not dier from discovery in 
physical, in-person arbitration tribunals. However, certain practical realities 
associated with shifting the process online have created discovery compulsion 
problems, again stemming from lack of a governmental back-stop. While 
earlier iterations of OArb struggled with this virtual migration, the 
compulsion process has improved dramatically over time.172 
One remaining complication is the determination of an arbitral seat.173 To 
reiterate, this seat supplements arbitrator authority by oering a credible 
threat of sanction in the form of traditional judicial intervention.174 The same 
determination is necessary for o-line arbitration, but the tangible nature of 
the contracting process greatly reduces seat ambiguity. OArb systems must 
therefore utilize the following two safeguards to determine an arbitral seat. 
First, many OArb systems allow geographically dispersed parties to 
contractually specify, ex-ante, a desired seat.175 The parties opt-in to the 
governing arbitral rules of a certain jurisdiction.176 While contractual seat 
selection might result in the cherry-picking of business-friendly jurisdictions 
(especially in the business-to-consumer (B2C) online commerce space), it 
does in fact establish a governmental backstop. This selection process has its 
limitations, as the chosen seat may refuse to honor the selection of the parties 
and opt not to adjudicate.177 However, the second procedural safeguard 
remedies such instances. When global parties enter into an online contract 
absent seat specication (or specify a seat that is later void), the arbitrator 
 
primarily produce evidence that favors their case, with arbitrators seldom or limitedly overriding 
the self-selection process. The scale and scope of the case obviously impacts the level of arbitrator 
interjection, but for present purposes, one may assume severe limitation in all instances. Such 
reduced production facially cuts against the notion of o-chain and on-chain discovery divergence, 
but in actuality it helps to highlight the key dierence. Id. at 571-75. 
172 See Karolina Mania, Online Dispute Resolution: The Future of Justice, 1 INT’L COMP. JURIS. 
76, 77 (2015) (“Despite the problems cited, new methods of communication have improved many 
areas of law—including modernising processes for the out-of-court settlement of disputes, examples 
of which are constituted by systems for online dispute resolution.”). 
173 Schmitz, supra note 81, at 211. 
174 Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 553. 
175 See Schmitz, supra note 81, at 211 (“These jurisdiction and choice of law questions may be 
resolved, however, by the parties’ agreement or development of a lex mercatoria, or delocalized ‘law’ 
incorporating general contract principles and e-commerce norms.”); see also de Witt, supra note 83, 
at 451 (“Most sophisticated parties, who are aware of the implications of the place of arbitration, will 
include an adequate provision in their agreement to arbitrate.”). 
176 See supra note 175. 
177 Schmitz, supra note 81, at 211. 
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herself often has the discretion to make a determination.178 Exceptions to the 
rule certainly exist,179 but those overseeing an arbitration proceeding typically 
have “broad powers .	.	. to establish the place of arbitration” based on the 
realities of the situation.180 While one can imagine situations in which 
documents and witnesses slip through the cracks, this presence of an 
enforcement backstop allows online arbitrators to instill some level of fear 
among relevant parties. 
Lastly and somewhat tangentially, it is important to note that parties are 
readily identiable in the online arbitration context. OArb may preserve 
physical anonymity by allowing users to remain hidden behind a computer 
screen,181 but the nature of typical online contracting and at currency 
payments necessitate identity revelation. As explored below, this creates a 
thick divide between OArb and on-chain dispute resolution compulsion. 
3. On-Chain Update Infeasibiilty 
In short, there exists a foundational distinction between decentralized, 
pseudonymous on-chain resolution and all other forms of adjudication. As just 
articulated, off-chain arbitration universally provides an option for arbitrators 
to compel production. In each instance, an order to compel is backed by a 
credible threat of punishment. Such a system does not currently exist with any 
on-chain platform. Of greater importance, such an option cannot exist while 
maintaining pseudonymity and decentralized resolution processes. 
a. Pseudonymity of Third Parties 
More precisely, the realities of blockchain pseudonymity negate any 
possibility of compelling third-party document production and testimony. 
Unfortunately, such evidence is vital to any system of arbitration. As noted 
in an article recently touted by the ABA, “[i]f arbitration is to be promoted, 
some discovery of non-parties is likely to be necessary in large, complex 
cases.	.	.	. Cases of this size demand at least the possibility of non-party 
discovery.”182 
 
178 de Witt, supra note 83, at 451; Salomon & Friedrich, supra note 85, at 553. 
179 See de Witt, supra note 83, at 451 (“The LCIA . . . provides that, unless the parties have 
otherwise agreed, the place of arbitration shall be London.”). 
180 Id. 
181 See Lin Q. Hang, Comment, Online Dispute Resolution Systems: The Future of Cyberspace Law, 
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 837, 858 (2001) (“The advantage of [online dispute resolution systems] is 
that they may preserve anonymity and resolve the dispute at the same time.”). 
182 Lowell Pearson, The Case for Non-Party Discovery Under the Federal Arbitration Act, DISP. 
RESOL. J., Aug.–Oct. 2004, at 46, 50. 
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Yet, on Ethereum, a third party is unreachable and un-threatenable for 
discovery purposes. Unlike the disputants, who have already locked 
cryptocurrency into escrow or wasted valuable time completing services, the 
third party has maintained complete dominion over its own assets (i.e. its 
cryptocurrency). Given that Ethereum does not enable the unilateral ning 
of bad actors, jurors have no method for punishing a third party who fails to 
comply with a discovery request. There is simply a lack of access to and power 
over the individual and her assets. Unless a third party voluntarily subjects 
itself to on-chain arbitration, any necessary documents or testimony in its 
possession will escape juror review. Indeed, even creative compulsion 
mechanisms such as threatening to ban a third party’s Ethereum address from 
the resolution platform would be of little value. In the event of an address 
ban, an individual could simply create a new Ethereum address or enlist the 
services of a competitor if she desired to use on-chain dispute resolution 
services at some later date. 
Importantly, ex-ante on-chain determination of an arbitral seat does 
nothing to remedy the situation. Assuming that a traditional court wished to 
compel discovery in an on-chain dispute (presumably after being asked by 
anonymous jurors), it simply would not have the ability to exert its inuence 
over a pseudonymous party. Unlike with OArb, where all relevant characters 
are geographically dispersed but readily identiable, on-chain arbitration 
presents courts with nothing but a pseudonymous Ethereum address.183 
There is little value in issuing a court order to a random of string letters. If a 
court were to impose a ne in at currency on an Ethereum username for 
failure to comply,184 the underlying individual would have minimal incentive 
to do so. This is especially true if the court is located in a jurisdiction that 
diers from the compelled third party. 
In order for a court to credibly threaten punishment, it must therefore do 
the improbable: dig beneath a user’s pseudonymous Ethereum address. While 
addresses are in fact “unique identifiers that leave a trail publicly visible on 
the blockchain,”185 this trail only fractionally helps connect a user to her 
address. To date, there are very few instances of involuntary Ethereum user 
identification. Further, any publicly visible identifiers are quickly vanishing, 
 
183 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 8, at 29 (“The open and decentralized nature of 
Ethereum allows smart contracts to be deployed pseudonymously and to operate in a largely 
autonomous manner.”). For an example of these pseudonymous addresses, see ETHERCHAIN—THE 
ETHEREUM BLOCKCHAIN EXPLORER, https://www.etherchain.org/ [https://perma.cc/X8CD-
PPDF] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). 
184 Hypothetically, these nes would be imposed pursuant to Rule 37. FED. R. CIV. P. 37.   
185 Price, supra note 52. 
1402 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1369 
as applications such as Monero186 and ZCash187 are actively working to make 
true anonymity Ethereum’s norm. 
This Comment does concede, however, that in the unlikely event that a 
third party’s identity is unwillingly revealed, and the governmental arbitral 
seat allows for compulsion, on-chain arbitration is effectively transformed 
into traditional OArb. In that far-fetched scenario, a court might utilize its 
own compulsion mechanism or the proceedings of the Hague Convention 
to compel discovery. But even if such identity discovery were regularly 
possible, it would fly directly in the face of blockchain’s promise of 
consumer autonomy. Revealing the identity of a third party, as would be 
necessary for discovery compulsion and accompanying governmental 
enforcement, unequivocally destroys pseudonymity.188 If pseudonymity, a 
core blockchain benefit, is eliminated, it may undermine the need or usage 
of blockchain at all. 
Interestingly, these compulsion concerns do not apply to intraparty 
discovery. Unlike unattached third-parties, disputants have already deposited 
a specic level of assets into the resolution platform’s smart contract. These 
assets are natural collateral for jurors to compel discovery. Presumably, 
neither contracting party is willing to forfeit the entire sum at issue to avoid 
a discovery request, which indicates that some lesser cryptocurrency ne 
would suce to trigger compulsion. 
b. Decentralization Compromised 
In addition to compulsion shortcomings stemming from pseudonymity, 
any mechanism that employs the use of a governmental backstop threatens to 
undermine Ethereum’s decentralization. Recall that blockchain exists 
specically to eliminate reliance on “authoritarian” governmental power and 
enable pseudonymous users to transact, contract, and resolve disputes entirely 
autonomously. As Ethereum Founder Vitalik Buterin previously argued: 
[I]t is much harder for participants in decentralized systems to collude to act 
in ways that benet them at the expense of other participants, whereas the 
leaderships of corporations and governments collude in ways that benet 
themselves but harm less well-coordinated citizens, customers, employees 
and the general public all the time.189 
 
186 About Monero, MONERO, https://ww.getmonero.org/resources/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/GTW2-JYPN] (last visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
187 How it Works, ZCASH, https://z.cash/technology/ [https://perma.cc/S768-B9ND] (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2019). 
188 The parties to a smart contract may opt-in to self-identification, but all other parties do not 
opt-in by default. 
189 Buterin, supra note 7. 
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Parallel principles apply in the discovery compulsion context. One might 
reason that external judicial oversight will lead to unintended Ethereum 
consumer harms. Consider, for example, the selection process of the federal 
bench. Political leverage and partisanship continue to exert an increasingly 
large inuence on the judicial selection process itself.190 Such ideologically 
driven appointments appear to be exactly what Buterin and fellow 
cypherpunks fear. 
Imagine for a moment that Ethereum has become the standard mode of 
commerce and every household in America makes purchases via Ethereum 
smart contract. If jurisdictional judicial oversight is introduced to backstop 
on-chain resolution, it might be to the advantage of commercial entities with 
political inuence to push for the appointment of judges with certain 
ideologies. Perhaps empirical data demonstrates that mandatory disclosure 
tends to disadvantage businesses in B2C arbitration. The likes of Procter & 
Gamble or Johnson & Johnson might start donating to candidates who select 
antidisclosure judges. In this scenario, the benets of decentralization are 
diminished through the implementation of a governmental enforcement 
backstop. This example is obviously embellished, but the underlying message 
remains. Governmental creep into blockchain transactions has the potential 
to delevel a supposedly unbiased playing eld. 
It therefore appears that making third-party compulsion feasible and 
maintaining decentralized integrity pull in opposite directions. It is 
impossible to implement a viable discovery system without a governmental 
backstop. Yet, even if such an implementation were possible, it would 
diminish the purely decentralized nature of on-chain resolution. Thus there 
is no obvious method for document compulsion that suciently emulates o-
chain OArb, physical arbitration, or traditional litigation. More precisely, the 
author cannot fathom a system that compels discovery while preserving the 
core structural tenets of blockchain technology. 
B. Flaw 2: Unavoidable Juror Incentivization Schemes 
As described above, most on-chain platforms implement some version of 
an incentive-based juror voting system. In such a system, pseudonymous 
Ethereum users who wish to serve as jurors begin by posting a bond to the 
resolution application’s smart contract. In some instances, a subset of bond-
 
190 See, e.g., What Is the Federalist Society and How Does it Affect Supreme Court Picks?, NPR 
(June 28, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/28/624416666/what-is-the-federalist-society-and-
how-does-it-affect-supreme-court-picks [https://perma.cc/UM2Z-5VJ2](“Leonard Leo, who was 
the executive vice president of the Federal Society, took leave from the society to construct that 
list for President Trump.”). 
1404 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 1369 
posters are selected as jurors.191 In others, all bond-posters are entitled to vote 
on the dispute.192 After juror selection, each juror reviews the evidence and 
arguments submitted by the disputants. The jurors then subsequently cast a 
vote for one of the predetermined possible remedies.193 If that vote aligns 
with a majority of other jurors, the juror is rewarded with cryptocurrency. If 
the juror casts a minority vote, she is nancially penalized through the loss of 
her deposit. Developers claim that these “game theory” dynamics help to 
optimize juror quality and thwart hackers who wish to rig the decision-
making process.194 While nancial and reputational incentives may assist 
platforms in avoiding certain major pitfalls, these same incentives open the 
platforms up to a wide range of new criticisms. Thus, this Comment will 
utilize the above four-step framework to explore inherent weaknesses and the 
continued viability of decentralized, pseudonymous majority voting schemes. 
1. Current Flaws with On-Chain Incentivized Voting 
a. Popular vs. Correct Opinions 
First and foremost, casting a majority vote is simply not equivalent to 
casting a vote for the correct legal result. Kaal and Calcaterra touch upon this 
schism in relation to the Aragon Network but do not fully explore its 
implications or root causes.195 To do so, it is useful to consider the bargaining 
power imbalances that ow from the United States’ low enforceability 
threshold for electronic “clickwrap” agreements. 
As the Second Circuit held in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 
if a firm provides “[r]easonably conspicuous notice of the existence of 
contract terms” and consumers express “unambiguous manifestation of 
assent to those terms,”196 a court will assume that a consumer has read those 
terms.197 While the Specht court specifically found its defendant’s notice to 
be inconspicuous and unreasonable,198 many subsequent decisions have 
 
191 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
193 Aragon White Paper, supra note 88. 
194 See, e.g., Kleros White Paper, supra note 88, (manuscript at at 8-9, 13) (describing how 
nancial juror incentivization protects against incoherent voting). 
195 Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 22, at 147-148. 
196 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002). 
197 See id. at 30 (quoting Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Eng’g, Inc., 
107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)) (“It is true that ‘[a] party cannot avoid the terms of 
a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing.’”). 
198 See id. at 32 (“[W]here consumers are urged to download free software at the immediate 
click of a button, a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sucient 
to place consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of those terms.”). 
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upheld the enforceability of standard adhesive online contracts.199 Such 
jurisprudence will appear patently unfair to common consumers, especially 
those who know the pain of incurring hidden contractual fees.200 This 
inherent normative tug to help the downtrodden is powerful, but it often 
flies directly in the face of the doctrine. Such a dichotomy reveals the flaws 
with on-chain majority voting. 
Traditional court proceedings represent the antithesis of the aw, as they 
enable a juror to follow the letter of the law without fear of economic reprisal. 
A juror is specically instructed by a judge as to what questions must be 
answered.201 Based on this framework, a juror casts a vote that is grounded in 
nothing but her own beliefs about the merits of the dispute. While it is 
certainly possible for a traditional juror to ignore legal precedent and simply 
follow her own normative compass, this does not negate the fact that (1) there 
is no immediate external nancial incentive to act upon such beliefs and (2) 
a jury verdict that simply does not comport with reason or law may still be 
subject to judicial review.202 
On-chain, a juror is specically incentivized to incorporate extraneous 
and frankly irrelevant factors. In the B2C context, the juror must ask: will a 
narrative built around evil corporations pull at the heartstrings of her fellow 
jurors? As correctly envisioned and predicted by on-chain application 
developers, such a consideration does in fact require game theory-like 
tactics.203 However, the focus of the game incorrectly shifts to incentivize a 
juror to vote for an outcome that diverges from the “right” legal result. Out 
of economic self-interest, the juror must instead predict how co-jurors will 
vote—eectively replacing the disputant as the proverbial prisoner in a 
dilemma. This system forces the decisionmaker to care more about her own 
well-being than the well-being of the disputants. When such a swap occurs, a 
 
199 See Hancock v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 701 F.3d 1248, 1259 (10th Cir. 2012) (“We conclude 
that Defendants’ standard practice gives U-verse customers sufficient notice of the TV/Voice and 
Internet terms of service, as well as an adequate opportunity to manifest assent to the terms.”); 
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing from Specht); 
Swift v. Zynga Game Network, Inc., 805 F.Supp.2d 904, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Because Plaintiff 
was provided with an opportunity to review the terms of service in the form of a hyperlink 
immediately under the “I accept” button and she admittedly clicked “Accept,” . . . a binding 
contract was created here.”). 
200 See, e.g., Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1562 (2019) 
(“This fee became a rallying cry for the Occupy Wall Street movement—protesters burned Bank of 
America debit cards, and an online petition against the fee garnered more than 200,000 signatures.”). 
201 FED. R. CIV. P. 51. 
202 See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a) (“If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury trial 
and the court nds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sucient evidentiary basis to nd 
for the party on that issue, the court may: (A) resolve the issue against the party . . . .”). 
203 Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 13). 
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juror with a perfect understanding of contract law,204 which assumes 
consumer readership for good reason,205 may veer away from a 
straightforward legal analysis. Kaal and Calcettera recognize this divergence, 
proposing a solution for future on-chain applications. They specically 
envision an application development 
that would include an open review system for evaluating the reputations of 
arbiters. Arbiters would submit their judgments to the community for review, 
removing all personal information to ensure anonymity. Members of the 
community would independently review and rank such judgments. Arbiters 
could improve their reputations by submitting comments and 
counterjudgments in an open forum.206 
While such a suggestion demonstrates promise, it fails to explain how 
community members are to be incentivized to partake in a coherent, neutral 
manner. Presumably, incentivization will again require nancial reward. This 
in turn means that the community will fall prey to the exact problem these 
authors suggest that they have xed. Jurors with nancial incentives to write 
“quality” opinions must consider what other jurors and reviewers believe to 
be of sucient quality. This type of review community might even exacerbate 
system ineciencies, as game theory dictates that an individual will have an 
occasional incentive to oer an untruthful negative review of a peer juror. If 
pseudonymous slandering could relatively boost one’s own reputational 
status, earning capacity, and economic wellbeing, that juror would be 
incentivized to partake. 
b. Lack of Legal Structure or Guidance 
Such misaligned incentives become more problematic when one considers 
the jurisdictional and legal ambiguity of on-chain decision-making. As 
currently congured, most applications do not allow disputants or jurors to 
utilize the laws of a specic jurisdiction.207 The ad-hoc nature of current 
 
204 Assuming the laws of single specied jurisdiction applies. 
205 If contracting parties were able to negate contractual obligations simply by claiming that 
they did not read or understand the contract, all contracts become meaningless. There are of course 
exceptions to the rule, such as contracts of adhesion, but the general doctrine is globally clear and 
aligns with the Specht court. 
206 Kaal & Calcaterra, supra note 22, at 148. 
207 OpenCourt is the one current exception, as it species that its interface inserts a stock 
“JAMS” arbitration provision into the semantic component of its smart contracts. OpenCourt, supra 
note 15. When such a framework is in place, jurors are not forced to start from scratch. If the parties 
choose an o-chain arbitrator or a single, third-party Ethereum user, the problem decreases in 
severity. However, unless an appeal process or workable reputational system exists that strips an 
original arbitrator of her fee, a single third-party is not incentivized to vote coherently or truly 
devote the proper resources to a dispute. 
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decision-making—i.e., a complete absence of rules and precedents—results 
in highly normative or highly localized judgments.208 
Importantly, if there are no overarching contractual performance 
standards, the voting majority becomes somewhat arbitrary. Juror A has every 
right to vote for a consumer because she hates big business. Juror B might 
cast the same vote because the argumentative brief submission makes the 
consumer seem like a nice person. Neither is unjustied in their beliefs, but 
there is obviously no nexus between their reasoning. Volunteering as a juror 
essentially becomes a game of crypto-roulette, given that a juror has little 
basis for understanding how her anonymous counterparts are addressing the 
dispute at hand.209 This ambiguity, in conjunction with the aformentioned 
incentivization schemes, creates two major adjudication issues. 
The rst is that of consistency. Similar facts may lead to wildly dierent 
outcomes depending on the normative groundings of the jurors. Ethereum 
users will have no idea how to structure their semantic or code-based 
contracts, as they will have no precedential guidance as to how such contracts 
will be evaluated when disputed. Such a system cannot stand. Indeed, to say 
that adjudicators may make decisions based on internal fairness 
considerations is to say that society does not require laws. As explored below, 
o-chain systems at least attempt to imbue the justice system with stare 
decisis protections. 
The second problem might be described as an illusion of uniformity. 
Consider, for example, the specialized courts promoted by Kleros and JUR. 
Kleros’ specialized “E-Commerce: International Deliveries Court”210 has the 
potential to attract jurors with facially similar expertise but dierent legal 
anchorings. Despite narrowing the subject matter of the dispute, this court 
does nothing to account for the fact that laws regarding e-commerce contracts 
dier drastically by state and country.211 One could very easily imagine a 
scenario in which the ve jurors with specialized expertise in e-commerce hail 
from ve dierent geographic regions. Without the need to adhere to a 
 
208 As Sklaro notes, “without the tools created for traditional contracts by traditional courts, 
parties will have to argue every dispute from scratch, and without any idea about how such disputes 
will be analyzed.” Sklaro, supra note 28, at 302. 
209 Such ambiguity extends to the disputants, who have minimal guidance on how to properly 
argue a case. 
210 See Kleros White Paper, supra note 88 (manuscript at 11) (displaying the subcourts available 
to jurors within the system). 
211 See e.g., Luz E. Nagle, E-Commerce in Latin America: Legal and Business Challenges for 
Developing Enterprise, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 859, 928 (2001) (“What is notable about these two 
approaches to e-commerce is that regard for personal privacy in international data communication 
is not uniformly addressed.”). See generally Samuel O. Manteaw, Entering the Digital Marketplace: E-
Commerce and Jurisdiction in Ghana, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 345 (2003) (comparing Ghanian e-
commerce jurisprudence to that of the United States). 
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singular legal framework or an ability to communicate, the jurors may rely on 
their priors and arrive at ve dierent analytically correct results. While a 
majority will inevitably form, certain jurors will be nancially penalized 
despite clearly arriving at the obvious (regional) result. This is an undesirable 
nancial result for a juror, and one that will make users wary to serve as 
arbitrators. If a juror’s nancial livelihood is tied to the normative 
predisposition of anonymous counterparts, that juror might be better served 
going to a casino. Such ambiguity will undoubtedly lessen the quality of 
arbitrator attracted to these applications. 
In sum, the nancial pull to diverge from one’s own analyses renders on-
chain juror voting deeply problematic. This possibility for incorrect and 
arbitrary voting is negatively reinforced by a current lack of legal guidance 
and precedent. Such systems are not sustainable in the long run, and—as will 
be explored—quickly deteriorate at scale. 
2. O-Chain Incentivization Schemes 
While decision-making processes dier greatly across tribunal type and 
location, Ethereum resolution applications alone resort to majority voting 
incentivization schemes. No other voting system in the world directly ties 
juror or judge payment to the casting of a majority vote. 
a. United States Federal Court 
The United States federal court system again provides the clearest 
contrast to on-chain juror processes. In federal court, jurors receive a at fee 
of fty dollars per day.212 There exists absolutely no nancial incentive to vote 
with the majority, as both criminal and civil cases generally require a 
unanimous verdict.213 If anything, such a system would incentivize a juror to 
withhold a majority vote in the hopes of prolonging the trial (given that 
employers may not deduct pay for jury leave, and jurors receive this 
additional fty dollars214). However, purposeful delays are unlikely. In a 
compulsory jury system, nancial compensation is a byproduct of forced 
participation on a jury, not a means of incentivizing participation or 
 
212 Juror Pay, UNITED STATES COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-
service/juror-pay [https://perma.cc/C5ZS-N8ZL] (last visited March 13, 2019). 
213 See FED. R. CIV. P. 48(b) (“Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the verdict must be 
unanimous and must be returned by a jury of at least 6 members.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(a) (“The 
jury must return its verdict to a judge in open court. The verdict must be unanimous.”). 
214  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TABLE B-3. AVERAGE HOURLY AND WEEKLY 
EARNINGS OF ALL EMPLOYEES ON PRIVATE NONFARM PAYROLLS BY INDUSTRY SECTOR, 
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED (Nov. 1, 2019), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t19.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UDL5-G2F5] (displaying that the average hourly salary amounts to far greater 
than fty dollars per day). 
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prolonging it. Further, even if jury pay was a juror’s incentive to participate 
and lengthen the trial, compensation is still not dependent on the juror’s 
eventual decision. 
Similarly, federal judges are not financially incentivized to rule in a 
certain way. The United States Constitution ensures such impartiality by 
providing lifetime tenure “during good Behaviour” and a specified level of 
income.215 Salary and job security are not at risk, allowing a judge to decide 
a case purely based on the letter of the law. Thus, a federal judge, like a jury 
member, may safely and securely cut extraneous monetary decision-making 
factors from the process. 
b. State and Foreign Courts 
The same cannot be said for adjudicators in many foreign nations and a 
majority of U.S. states. In these regions, popular judicial elections216 with 
xed term limits217 are the primary mechanisms for judicial appointment. 
States generally rely on the former, while foreign nations generally rely on 
the latter. In some instances, judicial elections are “partisan,” in which a 
candidate runs on the ticket of a particular political party.218 In others, judicial 
election ballots actively conceal the political aliations of their candidates.219 
Importantly, it is possible to nd causal link between judicial decision-
making and nancial compensation within these systems. A state court judge 
held accountable to an electorate may rule in a manner that she believes her 
electorate wishes. Much like when an on-chain juror casts a vote based on the 
normative considerations of co-jurors, a judge subject to an election may rule 
with the ballot box in mind. There is no built-in, long-term protection for a 
judge to make a correct but unpopular legal decision, as has been repeatedly 
 
215 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
216 See generally Judicial Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Judicial_elections 
[https://perma.cc/Q9QR-X8A9] (last visited March 13, 2019) (explaining the judicial election 
process for each U.S. state). 
217 See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure 
Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 819 (2006) (“Every major democratic nation, 
without exception, instead provides for some sort of limited tenure of office for its constitutional 
court judges.”). 
218 See, e.g., Alabama Judicial Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Alabama_judicial_elections [https://perma.cc/6Z33-CXUJ] (last visited 
March 13, 2019) (“Candidates for judge or justice who wish to run on a party ticket must qualify to 
run in an open primary by obtaining the legally required number of signatures to get on the ballot.”). 
219 See, e.g., Montana Judicial Elections, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Montana_judicial_elections [https://perma.cc/8HGF-6L8J] (last visited 
March 13, 2019) (“In the nonpartisan primary, the two candidates who receive the greatest number of 
votes advance to the general election. If only two candidates file for one judicial seat, both candidates 
advance to the general election.”). 
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demonstrated in federal court.220 The re-election of a state-court judge, and 
thus her nancial livelihood, is in part dependent on appeasing the masses. 
However, it is clear that the causal link between income and decision-
making is far more attenuated than with on-chain majority-voting schemes. 
An elected judge is theoretically evaluated on the amalgamation of her 
work, if not mere political affiliations. Thus, in any given dispute, the judge 
is less inclined than on-chain jurors to consider the financial reward or 
penalty for ruling in a certain manner. Presumably, the masses will seldom 
take such individual rulings into consideration on election day. While 
certain extremely high-profile cases attract the attention of the public or 
judicial reappointment political committees,221 this high-level scrutiny is 
most likely the exception to the norm. Such attenuation between decision-
making and compensation is obviously not true on-chain, where a crypto-
juror’s entire payment is always dependent on ruling in unison with a 
majority of her co-jurors. 
c. Arbitration Tribunals 
Arbitral decision-making processes—both in person and online—more 
closely mirror on-chain incentivization schemes. However, these processes 
are still clearly distinguishable from on-chain resolution in certain key 
respects. To understand how, one must rst understand the selection and 
payment processes of a typical arbitration proceeding. Stephen G. Rogers 
oers a succinct explanation of such processes: 
Parties to	arbitration	agreements frequently require “tripartite” panels to 
resolve commercial disputes. This format typically has each party unilaterally 
appointing one	arbitrator, and then the appointees or the parties either 
agreeing on the selection of the third, neutral	arbitrator	or requesting an 
 
220 See, e.g., Reid Kress Weisbord & David Homan, Are There Really ‘Plenty of Shapiros Out 
There’? A Comment on the Courage of Norma L. Shapiro, in EDITED VOLUME OF ESSAYS ON 
NOTABLE AM. JUDGES (Kevin Peppers ed., forthcoming) (manuscript at 4), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2952513 (“In each case, Judge Shapiro assumed 
the risk of reversal and the boomerang of public criticism for making a unpopular decision necessary 
to prevent other branches of government from abusing power.”) (emphasis added). 
221 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Manafort Charged in New York State as He’s Sentenced to More 
Prison Time in Second Federal Case, A.B.A. J. (March 13, 2019, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/manafort-is-charged-in-new-york-state-as-he-is-
sentenced-to-more-prison-time-in-second-federal-case [https://perma.cc/T64N-TVSP] 
(illustrating media attention to the criminal charges and sentencing of Paul Manafort, newsworthy 
because of his notoriety as a former campaign chairman for President Trump). 
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appointment through an agreed-upon institution such as a court or private 
dispute resolution rm.222 
Importantly, these party-selected arbitrators are not (facially) compensated 
based on the outcome of a dispute.223 Arbitral decision makers are paid 
specically for the work they perform, not the outcome at which they 
arrive.224 The fees can certainly be astronomical, but the hourly rates tend to 
be proportional to an arbitrator’s skill or expertise.225 Such pay-per-hour 
schemes initially suggest that an arbitrator is not incentivized to vote for a 
particular outcome, given that the nal payout will not be aected by the 
panel’s ultimate decision. 
But such a conclusion places the incentives of a non-neutral arbitrator 
under too strong of a microscope. Zooming out, it becomes clear that a non-
neutral arbitrator is bound to the party that hired her.226 Remuneration for 
the dispute at-hand is not subject to loss, but a failure to procure a winning 
vote may destroy the working relationship between the arbitrator and the 
disputant. Each non-neutral arbitrator is therefore nancially incentivized to 
convince the singular neutral arbitrator of its hiring party’s position.227 A 
failure to do so might result in a repeat oender hiring a dierent non-neutral 
arbitrator in the future. In eect, these hired guns have a long-term nancial 
incentive to rule in accordance with a specic party. Such an incentivization 
scheme might be likened to the popular election issue above, except that the 
repeat-disputant itself replaces the electorate. In other words, the arbitrator 
must appease its direct employer instead of its voters. 
Importantly, the above analysis fails to fully consider the role and eect 
of the mutually agreed upon neutral decision maker.228 If this third decision 
maker is truly neutral, the non-neutral hired guns simply become additional 
advocates for their parties. Because the neutral is not paid based on the 
outcome, she eectively becomes a singular, independent judge. In this 
 
222 Stephen C. Rogers, Can Tripartite Arbitration Panels Reach Fair Results?, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Fall 2001, at 27, 27. 
223 Deborah Rothman, Trends in Arbitrator Compensation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Spring 2017, 
at 8, 8-9. 
224 See id. at 10 (“While arbitrators occasionally discuss the concept of providing a xed fee for 
an arbitration, I am not aware of this becoming a reality in the eld of commercial arbitration.”). 
225 See id. at 9 (“The rates tend to rise with experience and prominence, but retired judges do 
not necessarily have higher rates than attorney arbitrators, even at the high end.”) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
226 See Rogers, supra note 222 at 27 (“Absent an agreement between the parties, their selected 
arbitrators are assumed to be aligned with the side that appointed them and to lack the neutrality 
expected of the third member of the panel, who serves as the ultimate decision-maker in the dispute.”). 
227 See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Assuming the neutral is willing to listen, a party arbitrator has the 
opportunity . . . to engage the neutral in an open discourse about the case.”). 
228 Assuming the above tripartite scheme. 
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instance, arbitration is theoretically subject to no incentivization issues, as 
this singular arbitrator will rule without fear of reprisal and based solely on 
reasoned beliefs about the merits of the case. Thus, even a singular neutral 
with decision-making power renders arbitration voting totally dissimilar from 
on-chain majority-voting schemes. 
3. On-Chain Update Infeasibility 
As with discovery compulsion, it is necessary to ask if juror-
incentivization aws are xable through platform redesign or whether they 
suer from aws inherent to blockchain technology. While two procedural 
safeguards exist that may blunt the ills of nancially incentivized jurors, there 
appears to be no technological alternative that completely corrects juror 
incentives. Thus, the below update suggestions may completely eliminate 
legal ambiguity but only indirectly and partially force jurors to practice purely 
meritorious decision-making processes. 
a. Standardized Frameworks and Precedential Decisions 
First, in order to reduce vote-casting based only on relative moral 
judgements (or beliefs about others’ moral judgments), parties to a smart 
contract should ex-ante incorporate a choice-of-law provision. If the jurors 
are presented with laws and rules to guide the decision-making process, they 
can be more condent as to (1) how they go about their own decision-making 
process, and (2) how their co-jurors will do the same. Identifying a legal 
framework thus helps to remedy both misaligned incentives and unstructured 
on-chain decision making. Legal ambiguity and game-theory considerations 
will still impact the outcome, but the scope of the problem narrows. Instead 
of predicting the entire universe of factors that a co-juror might consider, a 
juror may now limit considerations to how the co-juror will interpret the law 
and legal standard presented. 
Recall the example of a smart contract in which an Ethereum user seeks 
to purchase a website from a freelancer. The semantic component of the smart 
contract species a certain delivery date, but the designer reaches out via 
EtherChat several days before the deadline in order to ask for an extension. 
The purchaser agrees to the extension, but the parties do not alter the original 
smart contract. Well before the new deadline but after the original smart 
contract delivery date, the purchaser initiates a dispute. 
First assume that all jurors have access to all necessary facts but are not 
guided by a given set of laws. One juror might reason: a deal is a deal; extra 
side talk is irrelevant and it is not part of a contract. Another might think: 
the purchaser promised to give the designer an extension and then reneged, 
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so the purchaser updated and then breached the contract. These are both valid 
thought processes, but they are not rooted in any source of authority.229 
Now instead assume that the parties to the smart contract have agreed 
to adhere to the contract law jurisprudence of a jurisdiction that has strictly 
adopted the Second Restatement of the Law of Contracts. In this scenario, 
each party is forced to argue, and each juror is required to consider, the 
merits of a promissory estoppel claim.230 If a party brings a promissory 
estoppel claim, every juror considers the exact same set of questions when 
casting a vote: (1) Was there a promise reasonably expected to induce 
action? and (2) Was that promise reasonably relied on? The jurors may 
certainly disagree as to whether reliance by the seller was “reasonable,”231 
but this does not negate the fact that a legal framework has narrowed the 
range of ambiguous considerations. In other words, whether reliance was 
reasonable is a much narrower inquiry than who should get what money 
from this particular set of facts. Thus, either requiring parties to submit a 
choice-of-laws provision or implementing a default system in which the 
jurors may choose a legal framework232 will enable co-jurors to more 
confidently decide a case on the merits. 
b. Decentralization Concerns 
Utilizing choice-of-law provisions of course increases reliance on 
centralized-governmental institutions. Choice-of-law provisions would fold 
the legal systems of the world into on-chain dispute resolution, which might 
draw decentralization criticisms similar to those found in subsection III.A.3 
regarding discovery compulsion. If the choice-of-law provision in a given 
smart contract implements a legal framework that favors institutional power 
(e.g., U.S. law concerning adhesion contracts), an on-chain resolution 
outcome becomes subject to the same political pressures and skews as 
outcomes in traditional U.S. tribunals. 
Interestingly, the inverse would not be true. A ruling on Kleros would 
have no impact on a traditional contractual dispute because it has no 
precedential value. Further, judges and lawmakers would presumably not be 
 
229 As described above, this lack of standardized authority means that individual disputes with 
identical facts are thus subject to wild inconsistency and the predilections of their jurors. The same 
is to some degree true in traditional legal systems but may be blunted by the procedural safeguards 
discussed above (e.g., precedent, jury instructions, and appeals). 
230 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (dening 
promissory estoppel as “[a] promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action 
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or 
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise”). 
231 Thereby reintroducing game-theory considerations into the decision-making process. 
232 As with arbitration. 
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ruling with an eye towards the eect of an in-court precedent on on-chain 
disputes. Lastly, to compound the above discovery compulsions issues, such 
submissive adherence would not aid in providing a jurisdictional backstop to 
settle any unresolved issues. Simply because the anonymous jurors must 
apply U.S. law to a dispute does not mean that a judge has the power to 
entertain and adjudicate the dispute to which it is applied. On-chain dispute 
resolution would thus be passively subject to the laws of a given jurisdiction. 
To resolve dicult choice-of-law questions of this nature and the resulting 
centralization concerns, applications like Ulex oer a lexicon of generalized 
contract doctrines in conjunction with its dispute resolution services.233 
Specically, the platform has suggested that the ALI Restatements might be 
a sucient guidepost for its jurors.234 From such bare-bones doctrines, it 
might be possible for a resolution application to develop its own set of 
common law precedent over time. This would oer jurors a basic legal 
framework from which to work without the need for reliance on the laws of a 
particular government. The parties to the smart contract would have access 
to these laws before employing the application, enabling knowing consent of 
the adjudicatory risks. 
c. Juror Filtering 
The second safeguard ows naturally from this rst suggestion to 
implement some sort of jurisdictional guidance. If parties do indeed specify 
a choice-of-law ex ante, platforms would do well to limit the juror pool to 
those with an expertise or background in the law of that jurisdiction. Kleros 
and JUR developers have entertained this idea, suggesting that the 
applications may one day comprehensively sort users by educational records 
and judicial history (all of which may be preserved on the Ethereum 
blockchain ledger).235 Juror ltering, in conjunction with choice-of-law 
 
233 See Goro, supra note 110 (“The Ulex Core smart contracts would have . . . a concept of 
community forum . . . where plain english rules are outlined for a given community which are then 
used by the Ulex Core judges to render verdicts on subjective or other rules which are not possible to 
codify in smart contracts.”). 
234 See id. (“For instance, the following lines would get their own text file: 2.1.4. Personal 
Harm	. . . ALI, Restatement of Torts, Third, Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2009–12).”). 
235 See Ian Murphy, Would You Use The Justice Protocol from Kleros?, ENTERPRISE TIMES (Jan. 
23, 2018), https://www.enterprisetimes.co.uk/2018/01/23/use-justice-protocol-from-kleros/ 
[https://perma.cc/ACL5-4P7E] (“One solution that could be implemented here is a blockchain-
based skills solution . . . . It records all the educational records for individuals from school through 
to degree or doctorate. The system can even be integrated into corporate HR systems to record post 
education qualications.”); see also JUR WHITE PAPER, supra note 88, at 48 (explaining the Hub’s 
[i.e., different subset of courts] filtering process, assigning certain jurors to certain disputes based 
on relevant criteria). 
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clauses, would create a simulated jurisdiction that existed only for the 
purposes of the smart contract. 
d. Remaining Incurable Incentivization 
Each of the two above suggestions—choice-of-law specication and juror 
ltering—may help to converge on-chain decision-making processes with 
that of o-chain alternatives.236 However, it is important to remember that 
these improvements will be of limited value if there is no accompanying 
application mechanism that requires jurors to vote coherently. Thus, on-chain 
resolution is still subject to an incentivization problem that o-chain 
alternatives are not. Unless some other system of pseudonymous, coherent 
decision-making exists, the aforementioned harms owing from groupthink 
will perpetually plague on-chain dispute resolution.237 
Unfortunately, any shift away from incentivized participation and voting 
threatens to sacrifice the decentralized and non-compulsory nature of a 
blockchain. As mentioned above, traditional legal systems require 
mandatory juror service. Blockchains and smart contract technology, 
conversely, cannot unilaterally mandate users to serve as jurors. It is not 
possible to involuntarily render Ethereum its own jurisdiction and force all 
users to contribute to that system by serving as jurors. Although data access 
objects (DAOs) and virtual jurisdictions do enable this (much like Aragon), 
these examples are still very much opt-in systems.238 Any such system, in 
which inducement is required, will also require incentives for participants 
to adhere to the rules and goals of the system. 
An alternative possibility, as currently employed by OpenCourt, is to 
completely abandon an anonymous, majority-based crowd-sourcing juror 
system. Instead, this platform enables the disputing parties to actively agree 
upon a specic arbitrator (or set of arbitrators).239 Unfortunately, this creates 
a dierent, potentially more expensive form of adjudication, as an arbitrator’s 
credentials now become vitally important to her marketability. This negates 
the promise of cheap but eective adjudication, as quality arbitrators are less 
 
236 Such suggestions are not perfect but present possible avenues for exploration. However, 
one can easily think of examples where there will be conicts: for instance, consider a pseudonymous 
user in the United States that enters into a smart contract with a pseudonymous user in China, but 
the semantic contract contains a clause for arbitration subject to German law. 
237 See Aragon White Paper, supra note 88 (discussing focal point decision making); see also supra 
notes 203–20 and accompanying text. 
238 This would, again, require some sort of oversight that these anonymous jurors are voting 
coherently, similar to a federal judge’s ability to oer a judgment as a matter of law or a circuit 
judge’s ability to hold a prior nding as erroneous. 
239 Opencourt, supra note 15 (“Using this interface, each party can . . . agree on the blockchain 
address of who they select as an arbitrator.”) 
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likely to volunteer on-chain when they can command hundreds of dollars per 
hour o-chain.240 
Perhaps more importantly, selecting an arbitrator without some sort of 
incentive to rule coherently might, again, result in random and incoherent 
voting. An arbitrator who has collected a fee may simply issue a ruling and 
walk away. While this is true of normal arbitration, that arbitration is often 
legally binding and may be appealed to a forum in which the adjudicator has 
no nancial incentive to hear a case or issue a quick and incoherent ruling. 241 
As already discussed, pseudonymous parties on Ethereum do not have that 
same capability. They may not turn to government-backed, non-incentivized 
judges without revealing their identity or sacricing decentralization 
principles. If the parties and jurors are indeed willing to reveal identities to 
utilize involve traditional arbitral or legal adjudication methods, this calls into 
question the need for on-chain dispute resolution in the rst place. 
In sum, the author cannot envision a decentralized, anonymous method 
of juror voting that will produce consistently coherent votes while allowing 
jurors to vote on what they alone believe to be the optimal legal result. 
C. Flaw 3: Platform Scalability 
One nal aw, scalability infeasibility, must be examined before 
discussing the long-term viability of on-chain dispute resolution. Because this 
is a purely technological issue and many of the comparative legal systems have 
already been explored in depth, this discussion will only loosely adhere to the 
four-step framework. 
1. Structured Discovery Processes at Scale 
Ironically, the same systems that fail to ensure that jurors and 
counterparties receive pertinent information simultaneously risks its 
antithesis—an endless ood of useless, misleading, unorganized, or false 
documents. Again, the root of this problem stems from a complete lack of 
established procedure for synthesizing or paring back the inux of 
documents. To be sure, traditional corporate litigation presents the same 
 
240 Rothman, supra note 223, at 8. 
241 What Happens After the Arbitrator Issues an Award, AMERICAN ARB. ASS’N, 
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/les/document_repository/AAA229_After_Award_Issued.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2GHN-4VX2] (last visited May 6, 2020) (stating that “if a party wins in the 
arbitration and the other party does not do what the award says, the winning party may go to court 
to ‘conrm’ the arbitration award” and that the “Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) and some state 
laws provide the reasons why an award can be vacated (thrown out), modied (changed), or 
corrected,” but noting that “there are only a few ways to challenge an arbitrator’s award”). 
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ood of documents.242 But as discussed above, there are at least some limits 
on the proportionality of production, and law- and policymakers are taking 
active steps to reduce unnecessary clutter.243 While it may and often does lead 
to expansive document dumps, the traditional legal system (1) adheres to a 
regimented process and timeline, (2) oers the option to push for document 
exclusion from a record, and (3) presents continuous opportunities to 
dialogue with a judge or arbitrator about discovery process concerns.244 
Again, no similar processes exists on-chain. Currently, there exists only a 
point-and-click data dump. 
2. Advocacy and Fact-Finding at Scale 
Unfortunately, the shortcomings associated with discovery only 
compound as arbitration sequentially progresses. This compounding may be 
articulated succinctly: opportunities for advocacy are sparse. As currently 
designed, each available platform calls for counterparties to submit some 
version of a “brief” in support of their argument. In reality, this brief is a 
simple textbox that enables an Ethereum user (presumably without a lawyer) 
to explain why they feel shortchanged.245 There is no trial. There is no 
arbitration hearing. It is even unclear as to whether any of these systems 
maintain some sort of continuously adversarial process in which parties can 
respond to claims or attack the validity of self-produced evidence. In essence, 
on-chain resolution applications oer only appellate review of a disorganized 
and potentially distorted set of evidentiary ndings. 
Without a platform for full-edged advocacy, the minutiae of contractual 
disagreement become impossible to adequately unpack. As James 
Grimmelmann explains, “[t]he meaning of a legal contract is a social fact. So 
too is the meaning of a smart contract.”246 In other words, terms in a contract 
and lines of computer code are regularly rife with ambiguity.247 Thus, if a 
 
242 See Jason R. Baron, Law in the Age of Exabytes: Some Further Thoughts on ‘Information Ination’ 
and Current Issues in E-Discovery Search, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 14-15 (2011) (citations omitted) 
(“[T]he plainti claimed that ‘defendants engaged in a “massive document dump” by producing 1.8 
million documents’ placed on a series of disks that, in the plainti ’s view, contained ninety-nine 
percent irrelevant material.”). 
243 See Gregory L. Waterworth, Proportional Discovery’s Anticipated Impact and Unanticipated 
Obstacle, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 139, 141 (“The new Rule 26(b)(1) is but a shadow of its former self. In 
an attempt to curb the much debated growing costs, the new Rule 26(b)(1) supplanted the standards 
of the former rule with only two considerations—relevance and proportionality.”). 
244 Admittedly, o-chain arbitration is often subject to a truncated discovery and/or a hands-
o approach to document regulation. 
245 See OpenCourt Tutorial, supra note 63 (demonstrating in a video tutorial how to le a dispute 
and showing the textbox where the facts of the dispute can be inputted). 
246 Grimmelmann, supra note 59, at 3. 
247 Id. 
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contract calls for a party to perform a service “in good faith,” stakeholders 
might have dierent opinions on whether that threshold has been achieved. 
This is a primary takeaway from Sklaro ’s Smart Contracts and the Cost of 
Inexibility,248 and it extends to on-chain dispute resolution. While this 
determination is ultimately a subjective decision made by the jurors,249 it 
requires the counterparties to demonstrate the processes and actions 
undertaken in performing a contract. 
When a contract is simple and between two individuals, a single textbox 
might suce. For instance, imagine that an Ethereum user enters into a smart 
contract with a singular freelance designer in which the designer agrees to 
create an advertising poster for her business. The smart contract has a 
semantic, natural-language component that requires the digital designer to 
“act in good faith.” The designer works on the website for a week straight, 
creates several iterations, and submits one that she believes is perfect. If a 
dispute ensues, the designer possesses all of the relevant information, given 
that she herself performed all of the relevant actions.250 That designer can 
condentially, fully, and single-handedly describe the entire process in this 
single textbox. 
When a contract increases in complexity, this completeness becomes less 
feasible. Consider instead a hypothetical contract between a university and 
food supplier, in which the food supplier promises to make a good-faith eort 
to continuously deliver food on time, and the university promises to make a 
good-faith eort to keep attendance (and thus meal plans) above a certain 
threshold. Even if the initial smart contract implements every single oracle 
possible in order to document a picture-perfect record (i.e., video cameras 
that track the supply chain and submit daily inspection pictures, a link to an 
accredited third-party website for student enrollment, etc.), the number of 
players involved with each company, the actions and eorts of each player, 
and the reasons for those actions all contribute to whether the parties acted 
in good faith. 
The question then becomes: how do the likes of Kleros and JUR allow 
parties (or their lawyers) to synthesize, aggregate, verify, and present this 
information in a compelling, concise, and clear manner? Again, at present, 
the answer is a textbox. Theoretically, each party could collect and submit 
adavits from all relevant actors and summarize the ndings in the brief. 
However, without some form of in-court testimony, this system falls prey to 
 
248 See Sklaro, supra note 28, at 302 (“Smart contracts that fail to oer semantic and 
enforcement exibility will be useful in a very limited set of circumstances.”). 
249 A decision made without precedent, no less. See supra subsection III.B.2. 
250 It should be noted, however, that this ignores the value of precedential rulings as to what 
constitutes good faith, a topic explored below. 
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concerns of discovery forgery. A lack of in-person hearing opportunities may 
also inadvertently compound ambiguity facing jurors. Suppose, in an 
embellished example, the university president submits an adavit which 
simply reads: “I worked really hard to bring enrollment up.” Without the 
opportunity for further clarication via testimony, cross-examination, or a 
second round of adavits—as is currently the case on most platforms—jurors 
must now gure out how “hard work” ts into “good faith.” 
Of further potential concern, the above example again assumes away 
pseudonymity. The human element of good faith becomes much harder to 
examine when information about the contracting parties is shrouded in 
secrecy. What if, for instance, an anonymous user represents itself as a single 
individual, but in actuality is an organization composed of hundreds of 
individuals? One individual working tirelessly might constitute a good-faith 
eort, while a hundred people exerting minimal eort may not, despite each 
entity producing the same end product. 
This point is a crucial one. As touched upon above, the efficacy of OArb 
has increased over time due to technological communication improvements. 
Parties and advocates may meet via video conference and telephone calls, 
as well as store, share, and review large sets of documents at virtually no 
cost. On-chain pseudonymity directly negates this possibility. If a 
blockchain user is unwilling to reveal her name, she is most likely also 
unwilling to put her own face in front of a webcam and testify. Further, if 
the user is in fact willing to reveal her identify, this makes on-chain 
arbitration unnecessary. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, any technological updates to 
current on-chain platforms in which developers attempt to expand 
discovery opportunities will quickly become extremely costly. Recall that 
blockchain transactions cost cryptocurrency to perform.251 Further recall 
that as complexity increases, a transaction becomes costlier and slower to 
complete. This means that the promise of cheap and expedient adjudication 
begins to vanish as the pile of documents, number of hearings, and filing of 
briefs increases. Indeed, Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin has recognized 
the shortcomings of Ethereum’s processing power and has continuously 
hinted at forthcoming yet illusive overhauls to reduce transaction cost and 
increase speed.252 Until such an overhaul, large scale disputes will be 
 
251 See supra note 24. 
252 See Cryptomaniaks, Hey Ethereum, Any News About Casper and PoS?, MEDIUM (Oct. 13, 
2018), https://medium.com/predict/hey-ethereum-any-news-about-casper-and-pos-medium-
f6319773f810 [https://perma.cc/JZ5L-T5W5] (“Both Casper (Ethereum’s improved iteration of PoS) 
and sharding will help Ethereum scale from a financial and technical perspective.”). 
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prohibitively costly and potentially slower to adjudicate than if heard before 
off-chain alternatives. 
In sum, Ethereum is plagued by many of same scalability issues that 
originally faced traditional OArb. While OArb developers have learned to 
incorporate technological advances into the adjudication process, Ethereum’s 
promise of pseudonymity and the cost of encrypting and sending information 
present additional concerns that detract from the possibility of large-scale, 
on-chain commercial litigation. 
IV. OPTIMAL PATH FORWARD 
Lack of third-party discovery. Skewed juror incentives. Scalability 
concerns for on-chain commercial disputes. These are the inherently 
unxable aws that plague blockchain-based dispute resolution. The question 
remains, however, whether these aws are so detrimental to the adjudication 
process that they render on-chain application systems indenitely unusable. 
This Comment will therefore conclude by briey weighing in on long-term 
system viability. Given that any answer to this question will be a primarily 
subjective one, the discussion below pales in importance compared to the 
above elucidation of inherent aws. This nal Part does not intend to oer a 
denitive statement on the optimal path forward. Further debate and writing 
on the matter are strongly encouraged. 
In short, this Comment concludes that on-chain arbitration is viable 
only for resolving minor disputes. It does not offer a catch-all, long-term 
system for complex resolution. In the event that widespread, large-scale 
blockchain adoption were to occur, contracting parties would do well to 
build in contractual mechanisms to (1) reveal party identities and (2) 
migrate resolution off-chain. However, such precautions negate key 
blockchain benefits. 
A. Small Scale Disputes 
In a minimized, peer-to-peer transacting context, the aws associated 
with ledger technology do not negate on-chain resolution viability. Such a 
position stems from the belief that inherent aws will seldomly impact the 
result of minor disputes. When monetary stakes are low, the dispute is 
between two single-person parties, and few documents exist, third-party 
compulsion shortcomings will rarely have an opportunity to manifest. Why? 
Because simpler disputes tend to be accompanied by fewer variables. A 
person-to-person dispute will not often require third-party testimony because 
there is less opportunity for a third party to be involved in carrying out the 
contract (smoking-gun communication being the exception). Similarly, 
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majority-voting schemes become less problematic as contractual obligations 
become more straightforward. The range of game-theory considerations are 
more limited, as simple, individualized claims are more likely to call for 
simple, individualized arguments, analytical tests, and voting options. 
Lastly, even if all possible flaws were to manifest in a given case and 
negatively impact adjudication standards, such limited functionality may 
still bow to the expediency and convenience of the process. Effectively, one 
must engage in a cost–benefit balancing test, weighing discovery 
compulsion and potentially skewed incentivized-voting flaws against fast, 
cheap, and easy results. When examined in this light, on-chain dispute 
resolution can be likened to small claims court, in that these applications 
are suited to handle “relatively minor disputes involving dollar amounts that 
are insufficient to warrant processing the case through the normal court 
procedure justify expedited and simplistic handling.”253 As discussed at 
length, however, pseudonymity creates a major blockage to actually 
bringing petty claims before these informal physical halls of justice. Thus, 
if society’s two options are (1) allowing for on-chain resolution that is 
imperfect and may incorrectly decide a larger percentage of cases than 
alternative systems or (2) forcing pseudonymous parties to go remediless, 
the former seems appreciably more attractive. 
Again, this analysis is based on the proposition that individual 
identication is not possible. If blockchain does away with pseudonymity, it 
becomes quite clear that OArb or small claims court oer a superior 
alternative, even at the expense of decentralization. Indeed, in addition to 
removing governmental inuence, decentralization also aims to enable 
trusted, veriable anonymous transactions. Once this second benet of 
anonymity is eliminated through identity revelation, the above cost–benet 
analysis shifts. In this instance, the readily identiable parties must balance 
OArb’s promise of governmental compulsion against blockchain 
immutability. These represent the remaining distinct benets of each system 
when pseudonymity and decentralization lose value. Given that OArb’s 
reintroduction of a governmental backstop remedies blockchain’s greatest 
aw (no third-party discovery), and some legal framework is always necessary 
for proper juror incentivization, immutability does not appear overly 
important. Non-pseudonymous parties will receive a more thorough, 
principled adjudication o-chain. However, in this instance, the discrepancy 
between the two systems shrinks, and the author believes practical outcomes 
will not dier signicantly on- and o-chain. Thus, despite the presence of 
 
253 Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People’s Court Examined: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of 
the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003). 
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inherent aws that weaken the adjudication process, on-chain resolution may 
be used in limited instances for small claim disputes. 
B. Large Scale Disputes 
Any such notion of viability disappears the moment that the scale and 
complexity of a transaction increases. The source of complexity is largely 
irrelevant, as complicated contractual provisions and intricately organized 
disputants both erase on-chain viability. In either instance, scale magnies 
the negative eects of inherent blockchain shortcomings. Recall the 
university and food supplier contract example.254 In a dispute concerning the 
supplier’s good-faith eort to timely deliver food, it would be necessary to 
discern the activity of multiple organization members and third-party 
contractors. Witness testimony would be required to understand which 
organizational members performed which tasks along the supply chain, who 
oered truthful adavits, and what eorts were taken to fulll obligations in 
good faith. Unfortunately, the information-gathering opportunities that exist 
with on-chain resolution systems are simply too scarce to eectively 
adjudicate such a complex dispute. Binders full of harmful internal 
documents, videos of witness testimony, and third-party communications will 
simply be absent. Further, even if such evidence did manifest, the exchange 
of documents and videos over the blockchain, along with elongated 
adversarial proceedings, would prove prohibitively costly. 
Thus, any legitimate adjudication that fully develops a factual record and 
allows advocates to flesh out a claim will inescapably require (1) a loss of 
pseudonymity and (2) again, some sort of legal structure based on the 
doctrine of a centralized government. One must consider what blockchain-
specific benefits remain once such pseudonymity and decentralization have 
disappeared. The first answer that comes to mind is immutability, but this 
does not seem particularly important in the resolution context. Especially if 
on-chain resolution does not have precedential value, the immutability of 
on-chain arbitrator decisions does not offer appreciable advantages over off-
chain decisions.  
The best argument for on-chain resolution then becomes that payment 
will be immediate, automatic, and nal. However, the same result could 
theoretically be achieved via o-chain arbitration through use of a traditional 
escrow account. It thus seems there is no compelling explanation for 
subjecting complex commercial disputes to the inherent aws of blockchain, 
especially when OArb or other traditional alternatives require less hoop-
jumping. Any vision or expectation of a fully decentralized on-chain economy, 
 
254 Supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
2020] Smart Contract Dispute Resolution 1423 
even one in the distant future, must therefore be tempered. The inherent 
aws of blockchain-dispute resolution will not enable all aspects of modern 
society to eectively shift to a public ledger. It is certainly possible that 
business-to-business transactions will migrate on-chain, but it is unlikely that 
decentralized dispute resolution will serve as its enforcement mechanism. 
Therefore, all enterprises that are contemplating smart contract adoption 
should build in an option for o-chain arbitration or traditional litigation. 
One could see “Know-Your-Customer”255 precautionary techniques enabling 
this process, but such identity revelation again calls into question the need 
for blockchain in the rst place. Thus, the benets of immutability and 
decentralization may not outweigh the costs of overhauling current economic 
infrastructure to make all aspects of daily life crypto-compatible. 
CONCLUSION 
Unforeseen technological developments are certainly possible. Perhaps a 
new on-chain resolution application will be released tomorrow that will 
perfectly simulate traditional litigation at a fraction of the cost. Such a 
proposition, however, seems unlikely. Given the inherent, distinctive aws 
that blockchain technology introduces into the dispute resolution process, 
cypherpunks must seek alternative solutions to errant smart contracts or 
fraudulent human behavior that permeates a blockchain. An inability to 
compel discovery, skewed juror incentives, and limits to dispute complexity 
all render decentralized, pseudonymous on-chain applications perpetually 
inferior to o-chain alternatives. This inferiority may be less impactful as 
dispute scale shrinks, but will rear its ugly, insucient head the instant 
enterprise rms begin regularly transacting on a public blockchain. 
 
 
255 James Chen, Know Your Client (KYC), INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 28, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/k/knowyourclient.asp [https://perma.cc/F594-3FSW] (“The 
Know Your Client or Know Your Customer is a standard in the investment industry that ensures 
investment advisors know detailed information about their client[] . . . .”). 
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